Middle East: Israel
See also Middle East: Iran
Special Report: Israel considers its options in response to Iran's nuclear program
Summary --
With Iran's military and nuclear moves dominating the geopolitical landscape in 2010, there has been increasing analysis about Israel's possible responses. Indeed, the one country in the Middle East most likely to feel threatened by a nuclearized Iran is Israel, given the clear antipathy expressed by the Iranian regime against the Jewish state of Israel. Speculation has abounded regarding the likelihood of Israel carrying out military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, not unlike the 1981 air strike Israel reportedly carried out against Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor in Osiraq. That scenario has frequently been touted as a model of preventative military strikes to be used against looming nuclear threats. See below for the latest developments regarding Iran's provocative moves and analysis about Israel's options to be considered.
Iran's provocative moves --
On August 22, 2010, Iran unveiled its newest addition to its military -- an unmanned bomber jet. While the Karrar drone was not expected to have a significant impact on the strategic balance of the Middle East, Iran's decision to procure the craft appeared to signify that country's desire to expand its conventional weapons capabilities. Not one to miss an opportunity to threaten geopolitical antagonists, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was addressing the country's annual Defense Industry Day ceremonies, described the Karrar drone as a "messenger of death for the enemies of humanity."
Only days later, Iran remained in the international spotlight when it announced that it had successfully test-fired an upgraded version of a short-range surface-to-surface missile. The new version of the Fateh-110 missile, which translates into "conqueror" in Farsi, has been equipped with a guidance control system known for its accuracy. As well, its range has been increased as compared with earlier versions. According to Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi, the solid-fuel Fateh-110 missile was developed domestically by Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization and held the potential of striking targets up to 120 miles away. On Iranian state television, Vahidi said, "Employing a highly accurate guidance and control system has enabled the missile to hit its targets with great precision." The upgraded missile was to transferred to the possession of the Iranian military by September 2010.
While a short-range surface-to-surface missile is not evidence of a nuclear threat, it nonetheless recalls a report issued a year earlier by experts at the United Nations nuclear monitoring agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which indicated their belief that Iran could have the ability to manufacture a nuclear bomb. In that report titled, "Possible Military Dimension of Iran's Nuclear Program," experts intimated that Iran could well be trying to develop a missile system capable of carrying an atomic warhead. The document was based on intelligence provided by internal IAEA investigations, external nuclear arms experts, as well as IAEA member states. Of particular concern in that document were the following three findings by the IAEA:
- Iran worked on the development of an internal chamber of a ballistic missile, which would have the capacity to house a warhead payload described as "quite likely to be nuclear"
- Iran may have engaged in "probable testing" of explosives used to detonate a nuclear warhead; this method is referred to as "full-scale hemispherical explosively driven shock system"
- Iran may have enough technical knowledge to enable the design and production of an implosion nuclear device (i.e. an atomic bomb) "using highly enriched uranium as the fission fuel"
Moreover, the document concluded that while Iran was not yet capable of attaching nuclear warheads to its Shahab-3 medium-range missile, further research and development could lead to the production of a prototype system. To that end, the Shahab-3 missile -- with a range of up to 1,250 miles (2,000 kilometers) -- would place Israel within striking distance. Clearly, the upgraded Fateh-110 would not have comparable range, however, it was clear that Iran was intent on publicizing its growing military weapons capacity to the outside world. This was the case in September 2009 when Iran test-fired two short-range missiles -- the Tondar-69 and the earlier incarnation of the Fateh-110 -- followed by the long-range Shahab-3 ballistic missile and the surface-to-surface Sajjil. A year later, further unambiguous acts of defiance by Iran in 2010 were sure to raise the ire of the West.
Meanwhile, around the same period (August 2010), Iran announced it would commence building a new uranium enrichment plant in early 2011. The new facility would be only one of 10 new uranium enrichment facilities planned for construction in Iran. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's nuclear program, said in an interview with Iranian state television that "studies on finding locations for the construction of 10 new sites are going through their final stages." He also confirmed that construction would commence on one of these sites "by the end of the current Iranian year (in March 2011), or shortly afterwards."
These moves have been part of Iran's insistence on pursuing a nuclear program in defiance of Western powers, who have accused Iran of having a nuclear weapons proliferation agenda. While Iran has denied these ambitions and insisted on a program for peaceful purposes, it has nonetheless violated international regulations by constructing a clandestine enrichment plant at Qom. The construction of the secret enrichment plan in Qom -- revealed in 2009 -- was in violation of the safeguard provisions set forth in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and effectively fueled global anxieties about Iran's true intent. In response, the United Nations, as well as the United States and European Union, have imposed sanctions against Iran in an effort to suppress that country's nuclear ambitions.
On Aug. 20, 2010, Iran launched its first nuclear reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power station in the southern part of the country. The plant, which took 35 years to construct due to a series of delays, was to be operated by Russia. Indeed, Russia was to be responsible for supplying nuclear fuel and removing the nuclear waste. Due to Russian involvement in the project, the opening ceremony of the Bushehr nuclear power station was witnessed by Iranian and Russian officials.
The Iranian government hailed the development as a victory over its enemies. However, because the power plan has taken more than three decades to construct, it was an older model with limited contribution to the national grid. As a result, despite the celebration surrounding the opening of the plant, which would begin producing electricity in four weeks from the launch date, the significance of the Bushehr power station was regarded as more symbolic than substantive. Moreover, the real issue within the international community has not been a matter of nuclear energy production, but fears that Iran seeks to build a nuclear weapon. Accordingly, Iran has been the target of four rounds of United Nations sanctions due to its uranium enrichment program, which was quite separate from this nuclear reactor project. That is to say, whereas the Bushehr nuclear power plant used uranium enriched by 3.5 percent, weapons-grade uranium must be enriched by more than 90 percent. Throughout, it has been Iran's uranium enrichment activities at levels higher than three percent that have sparked alarm bells across the West.
Nevertheless, as before, Iran appeared intent on defying the international community with the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, saying that his country would continue uranium enrichment. To that end, a serious concern for the international community has been a pilot program to enrich uranium to 20 percent, which Iran contends is necessary for a medical research reactor. Clearly, this higher level of uranium enrichment has been a concern for Western powers more than Bushehr nuclear power station, sparking fears in Israel, which has a particularly hostile relationship with Iran and has suggested the notion of targeted military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.
Israel's options in dealing with Iran's nuclear program --
With Iran's nuclear moves dominating the geopolitical landscape in 2010, there was increasing speculation about Israel's own alternative options. Indeed, the one country in the Middle East most likely to feel threatened by a nuclearized Iran was Israel, given the clear antipathy expressed by the Iranian regime against the Jewish state of Israel. Speculation has abounded that Israel has been considering military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, not unlike the 1981 air strike Israel reportedly carried out against Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor in Osiraq. That scenario has frequently been touted as a model of preventative military strikes to be used against looming nuclear threats.
But the landscape in 2010 was quite different from the situation almost three decades ago. Notably, in 1981, even though Iraq and Iran were embroiled in a war, Israeli F-16 jet fighters encountered little resistance as they carried out their mission. While there was limited anti-aircraft fire, there were no air patrols of surface-to-air missiles to contend with. Clearly, three decades later, Israel was not likely to have such an easy field of action in Iran.
Then there has been the matter of whether Israel can achieve the same objective in 2010 as it did in 1981. Almost three decades ago, Israel was able to land such a blow on Iraq's nuclear facility that Saddam Hussein's regime was never able to build nuclear weapons. As of 2010, there was no such confidence that Iran's nuclear breakout capabilities would be curtailed in similar strikes. Of significant consideration has been the fact that Iran's multiple nuclear sites are dispersed with some in remote areas and others underground. The revelation about the clandestine Qom facility only bolsters the belief that there may be other such nuclear facilities across Iran. Indeed, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak acknowledged during a parliamentary meeting that facilities such as the Qom site "cannot be destroyed through a conventional attack." Accordingly, there is no guarantee that air strikes could do more than setback Iran's nuclear ambitions a year or two.
Nevertheless, there were clear signs that the military option remained on the table, given the Netanyahu government's decisions to increase the defense budget, distribute gas masks to all citizens, and simulate a biological attack. But there were also signals of Israel's awareness that the military options may not yield optimal results. Accordingly, Israel has shown support for the notion of sanctions against Iran, although its call for crippling sanctions may not coincide with the new impetus by the international community for targeting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in its sanctions. The international community, including the Obama administration in the United States, has not been keen to punish the Iranian people for the regime's ills, and has had to balance reticent powers, such as Russia and China, to even entertain the notion of sanctions. Thusly, targeted sanctions against the Revolutionary Guard and clerical elite have gained support. But Israel believes that only crippling, broad-based sanctions will have a sufficiently strong effect to stoke internal fissures, and possibly spur the collapse of the clerical regime.
By August 2010, around the same period that Iran launched a nuclear reactor at Bushehr and announced its plans to start building new uranium enrichment plant in 2011, the government of the United States reportedly tried to assuage Israel on the nuclear threat posed by Iran. According to a report by the New York Times, the Obama administration conveyed evidence to Israeli counterparts showing that problems within Iran's nuclear program meant that it would take at least a year for that country to actually build a nuclear weapon. That timeline, it was believed, would decrease the possibility that Israel would soon carry out a pre-emptive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities.
"Soon," though, has been a relative consideration. According to Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic Monthly, Israel was biding its time to see if the non-military options could yield positive results; however, it was nevertheless prepared to carry out unilateral strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. To that end, Goldberg contended that, at this time, it was Israel's belief that strikes against Iran's nuclear sites could halt progress on that country's nuclear development program for several years. That is to say, Israel now held the view that it could strike a blow at the nuclear breakout capability of Iran.
It should be noted that several strikes -- in the plural --would be needed to achieve such an end; among the likely targets would be the uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz, the formerly clandestine enrichment site at Qom, the nuclear-research center at Esfahan, and the Bushehr reactor. Undoubtedly, flying multiple jet fighters through foreign air space would present Israel with a constituently complicated proposition.
The logistics of such a military operation by Israel notwithstanding, the cost of such an offensive endeavor might be determined to be too high. Certainly, the likely effects were forecast to be manifold ranging as they do from geopolitical chaos to economic turbulence due to a potentially drastic spike in the price of oil. Iran and its allies could well retaliate by firing rockets at Israeli cities, which could effectively ignite a regional war. As well, extremist terrorist enclaves in the region, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, would have an accentuated rallying cry. The result might be an even more imperiled Israel.
Yet the question of peril has been at the top of Israel's agenda, given the belief that Iran may gain the technological knowledge to construct nuclear bombs within a relatively short period of time. It may be Israel's calculation that potentially deleterious consequences are worth the effort, given the existential stakes for the Jewish nation state. Those existential stakes were brought into high relief as a result of the vituperative threats uttered by Iran's leaders that Israel should be "wiped off the map."
Worth noting is the fact that a nuclearized Iran poses a threat not only to Israel but to other countries in the Middle East. Indeed, a nuclear-armed Iran would, itself, have a destabilizing effect across the Middle East, most obviously by potentially triggering a nuclear arms race in the region among other countries not willing to cede power to nuclearized Iran. But quite in contrast to the arms race of the Cold War, which actually functioned as a deterrent and managed to stabilize the international scene in some "realpolitik" sense, a modern arms race in a region known for suicide bombings could trigger catastrophic results.
For this reason, Israel may find some unlikely allies in its neighborhood in the form of certain powerful Arab countries, such as Sunni Muslim Saudi Arabia, which is not keen on the notion of a nuclearized Shi'a-dominated Iran in their backyard. Israel may also find there is a geopolitical benefit to resolving the Palestinian issue, thereby minimizing its field of enemies. But the very complexity of the Arab backyard may present yet another reason why Israel may decide that targeted strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities -- regardless of the risk -- are worth the effort. The smaller Arab states may be compelled to move from moderation and tacit pro-Western inclinations toward more hardline and pro-Iranian stances by virtue of the influence of a nuclearized Iran. That is to say, small Arab states may believe they have no choice but to throw their lot in with a nuclear Iran despite their past cooperation with the West. It was implausible that Israel -- and, indeed, the West -- would look positively on the prospect of a politically-strengthened and nuclearized Iran standing strong in the heart of the Middle East.
-- Denise Youngblood Coleman, Ph.D.
Houston, Texas
August 27, 2010
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