Rafsanjani was competing within a field of several presidential candidates.  Up to 1,000 other possible presidential contenders had been earlier rejected by the Guardian Council.  Among the hard-liner conservatives within the approved field of candidates were the following: the former police chief, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf; the mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; and  the former head of state-run media, Ali Larijani.  Among the reformists within the approved field of candidates were the following: Iran's former parliamentary speaker, Mehdi Karrubi; Former Education Minister Mostafa Moin and leading activist, Mostafa Moin; and Vice-President for Sports Mohsen Mehralizadeh.

Regarded now as a pragmatist and a centrist who enjoyed good relations with the country's clerical authorities, Rafsanjani took on a more progressive message for the duration of his campaign.  He called for improved relations with the West and also addressed the country's economic challenges.  Both issues were of paramount importance to younger voters who  made up a substantial portion of the electorate.

The political candidates knew that victory was not possible without capturing a lion's share of this particular demographic group.  But young voters were somewhat frustrated with the Iranian landscape.  Up to a quarter of the youth population has been faced with unemployment and they have become increasingly aware that only through greater integration with the global system will more growth -- and jobs -- emerge.  Meanwhile, their exposure to the West through satellite television and the Internet has meant that they have come to view things through a different cultural prism than their parents' generation. As such, they want to see better ties with the West, even as they begin to take on more of a Western lifestyle (if only in a clandestine manner). They anticipated the promised reforms of Khatami with enthusiasm, but were disappointed when he was unable to deliver on them because of the pressure from the hard-liners and clerical authorities. After all, the ultimate authority in Iran has resided not with the president but with the unelected supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khomeini.

Following the first round of the election, the two main candidates who garnered the strongest support were former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Tehran Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The fact that Ahmadinejad had garnered the second largest portion of the vote share was regarded as surprising, especially since early election returns suggested that a reformist candidate was coming in second to Rafsanjani.  Mostafa Moin and other candidates alleged that the election had been rife with fraud and vote-rigging. The public outcry led to the government call for a recount of ballots in four cities, including Tehran.  The allegation of fraud notwithstanding, for the first time, Iran would go through a second round -- or run-off election -- between the two top vote-getting candidates on June 24, 2005.

As voters headed toward the run-off date, they were faced once again with an ideological choice between conservatism and reform.  Conservative factions were encouraged to strongly support Ahmadinejad.   In fact, Islamic paramilitary forces were reported to have been instructed to vote for him.  In response, the Islamic Revolution Mujahideen Organization and the Islamic Iran Participation Front -- both known as being reformist organizations --  issued statements opposing military involvement in the political process. Meanwhile, reformist leaders urged supporters to throw their weight of support behind Rafsanjani. Whether or not he was their candidate of choice in the first round, the priority was to prevent a victory by the conservative hard-liner, Ahmadinejad. Even defeated reformist, Mostafa Moin, urged the country's progressive factions to unite to defeat Ahmadinejad. For his part, Rafsanjani called on Iranians to support him against the "extremist" in the run-off.  His also referenced the charges of fraud, noting that they had "tarnished" the election.

On the ground in Iran, there was  general feeling of shock among those with reformist inclinations.  Even among moderate conservatives, there was a sense of uneasiness surrounding Ahmadinejad's surprising showing in the first round of the election. Many Iranians were anxious because a victory for a hard-liner like Ahmadinejad could very well herald a reversal of some of the changes and social freedoms, which had been gained in recent years.  Several progressive reformists said in interviews that although Rafsanjani did not represent their philosophies, they felt compelled to vote for him in the second round, given the predilections of his opponent. Still, Ahmadinejad's considerable appeal resided in his populist message, which called for a system in which all people could benefit economically, in keeping with many of the principles of the revolution.  In a country where there has been a divide between the "haves" and the "have-nots," his message appeared to have resonated with a sizable portion of the voters.  His election success also illustrated the fact that while the discourse about Iran has often centered on its political theocracy and burgeoning nuclear program, on the ground, socio-economic issues, such as class, are important to many Iranians.

On June 24, 2005, when voters returned to the polls for the second round, turnout was very heavy. Many Iranians seemed very invested in the outcome and aware that their collective choices would chart the future course for the country.  Once the votes were tallied, it appeared that Ahmadinejad had won a convincing victory with 62 percent in the run-off -- almost twice the amount of votes garnered by Rafsanjani. The outcome meant that conservative  hard-liners now controlled all elected and unelected positions of Iranian government.

The winner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,  was born in Garmsar (close to Tehran)  in 1956. The son of a blacksmith, he also functioned as a revolutionary guard and was a supporter of the revolution in the late 1970s, which brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power.  He was also alleged to have been involved with the American  hostage crisis during that period.   He went on to gain a doctorate in traffic and transport from Tehran's University of Science and Technology; he was a lecturer at that very institution before being appointed mayor of Tehran in 2003. As mayor, he cut back on many of the reforms instituted by the moderates who had earlier been in charge of the city. As well, he shut down a number of the Western-style fast-food restaurants, removed Western-style advertising, and mandated Islamic-style beards and traditional garb for males. Perhaps as a result of these philosophical differences, he was excluded from key policy setting meetings by President Khatami. When he  entered the presidential election campaign, he was not very well known and expended no money on campaigning.  Instead his candidacy was backed by the conservative clerical elite and mobilized in the country's mosques.  His populism -- embodied in his charges against the wealthy, his campaign against corruption and his simple lifestyle -- captured the attention of significant factions of voters. 


Post-election Politics and Global Implications

In a statement presumably directed toward the United States and the West, the new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said that his victory was a blow to Iran's enemies. The new Iranian president also noted that his intent was to "build up an exemplary, developed and powerful Islamic society."  With regard to concerns about the possible retraction of social reforms, he said, that freedom originated with God and that Iranians already enjoyed all conceived liberties.

For his part, defeated Iranian presidential candidate Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani responded by accusing the authorities of dirty tricks and election fraud.  His angry response was echoed by other reformist candidates and their associated factions; they accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards and Basij security services of orchestrating a plot to ensure a victory by Ahmadinejad.  Indeed, officials from the  Interior Ministry  who were responsible for monitoring polling stations apparently received  about 300 complaints of electoral violations in the capital city of Tehran alone. The Guardian Council, however, dismissed all such allegations.

Meanwhile, a spokesperson from the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that  the country would resume uranium enrichment, which had been suspended since late 2004, and it would pursue its nuclear program.  The announcement, which had been issued before the actual election results were known,  was a symbolic indicator that whomever was elected to be president, the actual policy agenda of the country would remain under the control of the clerical elite.

On Aug. 8, 2005, the United Nations nuclear agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran had resumed fuel cycle work at its uranium conversion facility, which is located near the city of Isfahan. Since 2004, such activity was suspended to provide the appropriate climate for negotiations with the European Union (EU). However, on Aug. 6, 2005, Iran rejected proposals made by the EU for the purpose of halting its nuclear program. Iran went on to state that it remained interested in further negotiations with the EU, but that it reserved the right to develop its own nuclear power.  Both the EU and the United States have said that a resumption of nuclear development activities of this sort could result with Iran being referred to the United Nations Security Council, from which economic sanctions could result. The IAEA was expected to meet on Aug. 9, 2005, to discuss the emerging situation.  It was expected that the nuclear watchdog group would then submit a report to the United Nations Security Council. Indeed, the IAEA backed a United Nations resolution calling for a halt to Iran nuclear development program.

Meanwhile, United States President George W. Bush responded to news of the resumption of Iran's nuclear program by stating that he had not ruled out the option of using force against Iran. In an interview on Israeli television, Bush said that although he was working on a diplomatic solution, he was skeptical that one could be found. When asked about the possible use of force against Iran, Bush said, "all options are on the table."  Although many people doubted the wisdom of the United States launching another military attack in the Middle East when it was already consumed with the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American president seemed to use these cases to press home his point that military action was a viable possibility.  Indeed, Bush said, "The use of force is the last option for any president. You know we have used force in the recent past to secure our country."

Throughout, Iran has insisted that its interest in developing a nuclear program has been for peaceful purposes only, in order to develop nuclear power.  The United States has accused Iran of carrying out a clandestine program intended to ultimately develop nuclear weaponry.

In September 2005, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank, assessed Iran's nuclear, chemical, biological and long-range missile activities and concluded that Iran was still years away from being able to develop nuclear weapons capability. The assessment also noted that a diplomatic confrontation was possible between the European Union and the United States on the issue.  This was because the European body has been leading diplomatic talks with Iran, and this report could very well enforce the argument that a deliberative approach would be feasible, given the lack of nuclear development by Iran. The assessment also pointed to Iran's political restraint in the recent past, which has included shutting down its nuclear activities while ensconced in talks with the European Union.  Finally, the assessment noted that Iran could well be attempting to avoid international reaction and recrimination, and as such, they may decide to develop their nuclear capabilities over a much longer time horizon.

Also in September 2005, following remarks by Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad  that Iran had an inalienable right to produce nuclear energy, speculation abounded that the country would be referred by the United Nations watchdog atomic agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to the United Nations Security Council.  Such a referral could potentially result in  sanctions against Iran.  Iran's leadership in Tehran warned that such a move could result in its decision to begin  uranium enrichment, in addition to the uranium conversion process, which it had already resumed.  Tehran has also noted that there is a double standard regarding the countries that have been allowed to become nuclear powers.  This was a position likely to be appreciated by other members of the global community, and in spite of opposition from the West.

Hamid Reza Asefi, a spokesperson for the  Iranian Foreign Ministry, noted that Iran did not seek to pursue nuclear enrichment activities in the near future, however, if the IAEA undertook radical measures, it would be forced to respond in a corresponding manner.  The spokesperson also said that  Iran was "deaf to the language of threats."

Later in September 2005, a resolution passed by the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), essentially paved the way for Iran to be referred to the United Nations Security Council.  In response, Iran characterized  the resolution  as "illegal."  In the voting of the resolution, a majority of countries voted against Iran. These countries included  European countries, which had earlier been mediating an end to Iran's nuclear development, as well as India, a country which has usually enjoyed close bilateral ties with Iran. Russia and China opposed the motion and abstained from voting,  and Venezuela voted against it. Iran's foreign ministry accused the United States of placing pressure on other countries to vote for the motion.  Iranian officials in Tehran also maintained that its nuclear activities were not in violation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and that its nuclear program was intended only for peaceful purposes.  Still, Tehran warned that if it was referred to the United Nations Security Council, it could well respond by starting a process of uranium enrichment, and it could also terminate IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities and activities.

In October 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attended a conference in Tehran  titled "The World Without Zionism."  There, in front of about 3,000 students, he  asserted the view that Israel's establishment had been a move by the West against the Islamic world.   But it was his statement that Israel be wiped off the map that evoked outcry and harsh criticism from many countries across the world. His actual words were, "As the Imam [Iran's late revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini] said, Israel must be wiped off the map."

In response, the European Union, Russia and Canada expressed their condemnation.  The United States said that the comment illustrated why there should be concern about Iran's nuclear program.  For its part, Israel called for Iran to be expelled from the United Nations.  The United Nations Security Council issued its own statement condemning President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad over his comments.

Iran then explained that its president's remarks were not a threat against Israel and not intended to express a potential attack on Israel. The Foreign Ministry of Iran also said that it respected the United Nations charter and that it was not threatening the use of force. Iranian officials also were quick to point out that as harsh as the rhetoric might have been, there was nothing particularly new about the words uttered by the Iranian president since they were the slogan of the 1979  revolution.  They also accused the international media of not presenting President Ahmadinejad's words in proper context.

The rapid response from Iran showed the country's desire to prevent alienation from the international community.  The incident, in its own way, also managed to elicit something of an assertion from Iran that it would not attack Israel -- the first assertion of this kind ever.

In the first week of November 2005, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator and the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani,  issued a letter to the United Kingdom, France and Germany, calling for the resumption of talks regarding its program of nuclear development.  The letter welcomed constructive and logical negotiations.  No official response from the United Kingdom, France and Germany was immediately forthcoming. Talks with the three European countries, known as the "EU3,"  had stalled in August 2005 when Iran resumed uranium conversion activities.  Observers speculated that the overture from Iran had been sparked by the recent fallout from the intemperate remarks by President Ahmadinejad regarding  Israel. The international outrage, manifest symbolically by the cancellation of talks by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, may have signaled a warning to Iran that such destructive rhetoric would not pave the way toward further integration with the international community.

Recent Developments

World powers commenced meetings in London in mid-January 2006 to discuss how to deal with Iran following its decision to resume nuclear development.  The issue of Iran's nuclear development program escalated after Iran broke the seals on a nuclear facility, ending a two-year moratorium on nuclear research.  The United States (U.S.), the United Kingdom (U.K.), France, Russia, China and Germany were set to consider the strategy pertaining to the escalating diplomatic impasse with Iran.  On the table has been the question of whether or not to apply economic sanctions.

Earlier the U.K., France and Germany said that ongoing talks with Iran over its controversial nuclear development program had reached a "dead end" and called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog group, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Indeed, the three European countries began work drafting a resolution to submit to the  IAEA that demanded that Iran to be referred to the  United Nations Security Council, which has the power to enact economic sanctions.  United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that the responsibility resided with Iran to reassure the international community about its intentions.  To this end he said, "The onus is on Iran to act to give the international community confidence that its nuclear program has exclusively peaceful purposes."  He also warned that trust had been "sorely undermined by its [Iran's]  history of concealment and deception."

While the United States was expected to strongly back such a resolution, there have been anxieties about whether or not China and Russia would support it. Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that compromise was still possible.  He said that Iran had not rejected a Russian offer by which the enrichment of uranium would be provided by Russia for Iran's nuclear program.  Such an arrangement would effectively prevent Iran from actually making nuclear weapons.  Despite Russia's own interests in Iran's nuclear industry, however, Western diplomats have hinted that Russia would not ultimately stand in the way of sanctions.  Russia, however, did not appear enthused about the prospects of moving quickly in the direction of sanctions.  Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "The question of sanctions against Iran puts the cart before the horse. Sanctions are in no way the best, or the only, way to solve the problem."  For its part, China has presented more of a challenge and has continued to be reticent about the notion of  sanctions, perhaps due to its own energy interests.  Indeed, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying, "All relevant sides should remain restrained and stick to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiations."

By January 17, 2006, the U.K. appeared to have hardened its own stance, rejecting  both Iran's offer to return to the negotiating table as well as the Russian compromise. Instead, the U.K., France and Germany said that they would ask for a meeting with the IAEA in early February 2006. After looking back on the past years of negotiations, these European countries concluded that the time had been spent by Iran on  further development of its uranium enrichment capability, to the extent that traces of weapons-grade uranium had been found on centrifuges.

Meanwhile, the European Union Foreign Policy head, Javier Solana, was  meeting with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in New York to discuss the matter.  As well, Mohammed ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA, was meeting with United States Under-Secretary of State Robert Joseph in Vienna regarding Iran.  For his part, ElBaradei warned that his patience with Iran was running thin.  After three years of intensive efforts, he remained unable to conclude whether or not Iran's nuclear program has been aimed purely at energy creation, as the Iranian government has claimed, rather than at the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as many in the West have feared.

Iran has steadfastly denied that it wishes to develop nuclear weaponry. Indeed, in a rare press conference in the capital city of Tehran in mid-January 2006,  President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad even said that Iran did not need nuclear weapons.  He went on to note that nuclear arsenals were needed by people who "want to solve everything through the use of force." Instead, he maintained the position that Iran had the right to develop nuclear technology. It is this issue -- of Iran's right to develop nuclear technology -- that requires a bit more attention.  For Iran, and other countries whose sovereign roots have been growing stronger in the post-independence phase of national development, there is a need to assert selfhood and sovereignty on par with other countries in the global community.  International actors and agencies seeking to constrain that "right" have thusly found themselves ensconced in escalating imbroglios, often infused with the spirit of identity politics.  Why should the West have the right to nuclear power when Iran cannot?  Why should India and Israel be allowed to have nuclear programs while Iran does not? Certainly, there has been little public criticism in recent years of the nuclear programs of Israel and India. Still, neither Israel nor India has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, as such, neither country is bound by its provisions as Iran happens to be.  Moreover, both India and Israel are functioning democracies with legacies of peaceful transitions of power.  As such, they are deemed to be less threatening to global insecurity and instability in comparison with countries such as Iran and North Korea. 

In his press conference, the Iranian president also accused some leaders of the West of having faulty logic on the nuclear issue.  To this end he said, "Leaders who believe they can create peace for themselves by creating war for others are mistaken." He also noted that some leaders had "medieval mindsets" and wished to deprive Iran of valuable technology, without any evidence that his country had committed any wrongdoing.    While this stance may resonate with others in the developing world who do not wish to be bullied by the West, support for Iran's position has been severely undercut by a series of rather intemperate remarks by  President Ahmadinejad as regards Israel.  Since coming to power, the Iranian leader has said that "Israel must be wiped off the map."  He also appeared to question the truth of the Jewish holocaust saying, "They have created a myth today they call the massacre of Jews  and they consider it a principle about God, religions and the prophets." Such rhetoric has been reminiscent of the late leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who said, "Every Muslim has a duty to prepare himself for battle against Israel."  Even Iranian so-called reformists, such as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, have uttered anti-Israel rhetoric. 

Following on the path of these words, some have concluded that ideological differences lie at the heart of the nuclear issue in Iran.  They have argued that popular support for an independent Palestinian state has fueled the hard-line position of the Iranian government over the years, and has spurred the vitriol against Israel, and by extension, the West.  Still, Iran has never actually gone to war with Israel.  Moreover, in recent years, anti-Israel ranting has found little resonance among Iranian youth despite the regularity with which it occurs. Iranians today are concerned about democratic rights that have never been realized, the economy, and the problem of unemployment.  These frustrations were manifest in the 2002 labor protests.  Meanwhile, it has become increasingly common to hear Iranians say, "Forget Palestine, what about us?" Still, in a country that can hardly be regarded as a democracy, such dissonance is not likely to result in any policy shift from the Supreme Leader or the Guardian Council, which hold the real power in Iranian politics and society and whose positions are stultified.  As a result, leaders have continued to regularly emit vituperative pieces on the evils of the state of Israel, while the Iranian citizens have increasingly ignored them.

The eroding connection between the people and the leaders of Iran notwithstanding, it is a common sense of Iranian identity -- of patriotism and national pride --  that unites people in their belief that Iran should have the right to nuclear research and development, without interference from the West.  Bolstered with popular backing for its nuclear plans, it is unlikely that Iran will be easily cowed into submission by international pressure. With Europe, led by the U.K., France and Germany, recommending action in the form of sanctions by the United Nations Security Council, the matter is sure to become increasingly complex. In anticipation of such a threat, Iran has warned that the imposition of economic sanctions would  result in higher oil prices.  Indeed, Iranian Economy Minister Davoud Danesh-Jafari said: "Any possible sanctions on Iran... could possibly, by disturbing Iran's political and economic situation, raise oil prices beyond levels the West expects." As a result, there was increasing anxiety about the possible repercussions on the global oil market.

With time running out in late January 2006, the European Union said that it would agree to meet with Iran a final time to try to resolve the impasse over Iran's nuclear program.  Still, a spokesperson from the government of the United Kingdom said that Europe still held its position that the time had come for the United Nations Security Council to become involved.  Such involvement would likely come in the form of economic sanctions.

During separate meetings in London, foreign ministers from Europe -- the United Kingdom, France and Germany -- were also scheduled to meet with counterparts from the United States, Russia and China to discuss a coordinated response to the same matter. Again, Moscow and Beijing argued for more time to resolve the matter with Iran, however, neither of the two countries foreclosed the possibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) referring Iran to the United Nations Security Council in anticipation of possible economic sanctions.  There was still some hope that the Russian compromise (discussed above) might come in to play. Whether or not the Russian compromise was actually advanced, however, United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Jack Straw noted that a resolution would have to offer Iran to come out of the negotiations with its national dignity in tact.  To this end he said, "We must have a bargain which enables both sides to come out of it with their head held high."  He also emphasized the position held by the Europeans that the impasse with Iran must be resolved diplomatically and not via military action.

On February 4, 2006, the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), voted to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council regarding its nuclear activities.  The actual resolution at stake specified that Iran should extend "indispenable and overdue" cooperation with the IAEA intended to "clarify possible activities which could have a military dimension." The vote came after several days of intense diplomatic negotiations and was expected to eventually lead to the implementation of sanctions against Iran.

Twenty seven countries on the board of the IAEA voted in support of reporting Iran, five countries abstained, and three countries  voted against the measure.  Russia and China voted in favor of the resolution after being given assurances that there would be no immediate threat of sanctions against Iran.   Indeed, the resolution also deferred any possible action by the United Nations Security Council until the delivery of a report by the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, on Iranian compliance.  The report was set to be delivered on March 6, 2006.

Some observers suggested that the overwhelming vote in support of the resolution by the IAEA board showed strong and shared support for the measure.  Certainly, United States ambassador to the IAEA, Gregory Schulte, said that the vote conveyed a "very powerful signal"  and intimated that Iran's response would be telling. Likewise, United States Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, said that the United States hoped that Iran would take seriously the "clear message" from the IAEA. But  Javad Vaiedi, the deputy head of the Supreme National Security Council, observed that the vote was politically motivated and did not, in fact,  reflect a high level of  international consensus.

Following the decision to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council, the Iranian authorities in Tehran maintained that its nuclear development efforts were  not for military objectives.  Tehran then went on to assert that its uranium enrichment activities would resume.  As well, Iranian President  Ahmadinejad warned that in response to the resolution of the IAEA, volutary cooperation with the IAEA would be halted. A day later on February 5, 2006, Tehran declared its intent to stop snap inspections at its nuclear facilities.

By February 6, 2006, United States Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, asserted that all options, including military action against Iran, remained on the proverbial table as a possible option.   In response,  the Russia's foreign minister warned against such threats and the Russian government was expected to resume negotiations on the aforementioned compromise plan. Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that he was optimistic that Tehran would seriously consider the proposal as a means of moving forward. As well, Egypt was considering putting forth a proposal by which the Middle East would be a nuclear weapon free zone.

Meanwhile, markets responded to the latest developments with a rise on oil prices as anxieties increased about possible disruptions in oil from Iran, which is OPEC's second-largest supplier.

In mid-February 2006, diplomats from the United Nations said  that Iran had restarted the process of uranium enrichment, as evidenced by the feeding of uranium gas into centrifuges.  Uranium enrichment is the preliminary  step in the process leading to the production of  fuel for nuclear reactors and bomb-making. The move was anticipated since Iranian authorities in Tehran had earlier warned of the resumption of enrichment activities after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported the country to  the United Nations Security Council. Since then, Tehran has likewise warned that it will also cease cooperation with United Nations nuclear inspectors seeking to carry out  snap inspections at nuclear facilities. 

In a further development, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said that he was considering withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT).  If Iran moves forward with this measure, it will join North Korea to form a duet of countries which have abandoned the NNPT and resumed nuclear development in recent years. 

The situation devolved further when Tehran indefinitely postponed talks with Moscow regarding the compromise plan for Russia to provide enriched uranium to Iran for its nuclear energy program.   Nevertheless, by late February 2006, Tehran moved in a more cooperative direction and said that it would be willing to move forward with discussion aimed at exploring the Russian compromise proposal.  While Tehran was not expected to acquiesce to the Russian proposal completely, the return to the negotiating table suggested some small shift in the nuclear impasse. 

The matter has evoked questions about how to strike the correct balance between the right of counties to have nuclear technology with the right of the international community to limit the proliferation of nuclear weaponry across the globe.

In the backdrop of these developments was a story published by the London Daily Telegraph, which intimated that Pentagon strategists were making plans to launch attacks against  Iran's nuclear sites.  Such attacks would be undertaken as measures of "last resort" for the purpose of foreclosing any possibility that Teheran might try develop nuclear weaponry. While the White House in the United States has said that it would prefer to handle the matter using diplomatic channels, President George W. Bush has not ruled out the possibility of military action.

In March 2006, Mohamed ElBaradei,  the head of the IAEA,  called on both Iran and the West to return to the negotiating table to discuss Iran's nuclear development program.  He cautioned that there would be long-term implications for global peace.  In this regard, he said, "It has to do with regional security, the whole Middle East regional security is very much at stake and escalation is not going to help." ElBaradei  spoke at the commencement of an IAEA meeting that could herald United Nations Security Council action against Iran for its uranium enrichment activities. 

Iran announced on April 11, 2006 that it had succeeded in enriching uranium on a small scale for the first time.  The enrichment process used 164 centrifuges at a facility in Natanz. Iranian President Ahmadinejad characterized the occasion as a "very historic moment" and noted that it signified "the start of the progress of the country."  As he had before,  he called on the West to respect Iran's  right to pursue the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.  

 It was a position steadfastly opposed by the United States, which asserted that Iran should not have any kind of nuclear development program. United States (U.S.)  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded to the news by warning that the United Nations Security Council would examine available options aimed at forcing Iran to "obey the international system."   British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that Iran's decision to enrich uranium, albeit on a small-scale basis, "further undermines international confidence in the regime and is deeply unhelpful."  China expressed concern about the path Iran was taking, but was believed to be against taking drastic action against Iran, preferring a diplomatic solution. Likewise, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Iran was moving "in the wrong direction," however,  he cautioned against unduly dramatizing the situation and again noted that Moscow was against military action against Iran. 

The news from Iran came around the same time as public attention was drawn to an article in the New Yorker magazine by Seymour Hersch, which asserted that the United States military was drawing up plans to use military action in Iran that included the possible use of nuclear weaponry. For his part, United States President George W. Bush said he would not rule out the military option in dealing with Iran.

Meanwhile, Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency -- the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was set to travel to Tehran to discuss the crisis.  ElBaradei was scheduled to report back to the United Nations Security Council at the close of April 2006 regarding Tehran's compliance with the demand to halt enrichment activity by the close of April, or face the consequence of international isolation. United Nations  Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed hope on April 12, 2006 that IAEA head would be able to bring Iran back to the negotiating table. But the  mid-April 2006 to Tehran by the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, failed to change Iran's position. Still, the nuclear watchdog chief said that an agreement was in place to continue dialogue on the issue.

The notion of dialogue was echoed on April 16, 2006 in the bipartisan call by members of the U.S. Senate for direct bilateral talks between the United States and Iran. Richard Lugar of Indiana, the Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said it was too soon to press for sanctions and noted that direct bilateral talks would be "useful." He said, "The Iranians are a part of the energy picture. We need to talk about that."  Democratic Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut expressed a similar sentiment saying, "I happen to believe you need direct talks. It doesn't mean you agree with them.... But there's an option." The position expressed by these Senators was at odds with the unilateral demands articulated by the executive branch of government in the United States.

According to Iranian authorities, the country operated 164 centrifuges, thus enabling  "industrial output" of enriched uranium. However, the process only created low-level enrichment needed for nuclear fuel. In order to create the highly enriched uranium needed for nuclear weapons, Iran would need thousands of centrifuges. Various sources have thusly said that Iran will not be immediately capable of making a nuclear bomb. Some predictions were as short as within a year; others suggested a ten-year timeline. The London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies has said that Iran could produce enough fissile nuclear material to make a nuclear bomb within 3 years. 

In late April 2006, just days before a deadline issued by the United Nations for Iran to halt its nuclear program, the government in Tehran said that its uranium enrichment and nuclear research activities were  "irreversible." As well, Hamid Reza Asefi, a spokesperson for the country's Foreign Ministry said that demands for Iran to stop its nuclear research were "not on the agenda."

Leading up to the April 28, 2006 deadline, diplomatic efforts intesified with some countries calling for a less confrontational stance in negotiations on Iran's controversial nuclear program.  To this end, the United States Department of State gave permission to United States Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, to convene direct talks with Iran.  Although the talks were to be oriented toward Iran-Iraq relations, the opening up of dialogue was viewed as a step away from the hardline approach taken so far by the United States in regard to Iran.   In addition, efforts by the Russians were underway to revist the compromise concept of Iranian uranium enrichment on Russian territory.

By the close of April 2006, although Iran stood firm in its expressed right to pursue nuclear enrichment, the government said that it would allow International Atomic  Energy  Agency (IAEA) inspectors to monitor nuclear sites if the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council did not intervene.  

The United States dismissed the offer by Iran, stating that Iran would have to entirely give up its nuclear ambitions and without that, debate would now have to be taken up by the  U.N. Security Council. United States  Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, said on April 30, 2006 that Iran was "playing games" and that the United States would pursue a United Nations resolution requiring Iran to comply with demands that it cease its uranium enrichment activities.  Rice also referenced Chapter 7 of the United Nations charter, which provides for enforcement via penalties or military action.  Echoing a previously stated position of the Bush administration prior to the invasion of Iraq, she noted that the credibility of the United Nations was at stake.  Rice said, "The international community's credibility is at stake here. And we have a choice, too. We can either mean what we say, when we say that Iran must comply, or we can continue to allow Iran to defy."

Economic sanctions were the most likely route anticipated as regards Iran's non-compliance.   The United States and its European allies had earlier advanced the notion of sanctions after the IAEA confirmed that Iran had successfully produced enriched uranium and later defied the U.N. Security Council's deadline to cease such activities. But punitive responses, such as sanctions, have constituted a route that two U.N. Security Council permanent members -- Russia and China -- have been reticent about supporting.

For its part, Iran has said that it does not believe that the U.N. would impose sanctions and it has also warned about the possible effects on the price of oil globally.  Meanwhile, in Tehran, a spokesperson for the country's Foreign Ministry, Hamid Reza Asefi,  said that his country sough to resolve the matter through diplomatic means and not as a result of pressure and threats. 

In other nuclear developments, Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad earlier announed that Iran was testing a more advanced centrifuge, known as a P-2, which can quickly enrich uranium.  This announcement did little to assuage fears by the West that Iran's ultimate goal is to develop nuclear weaponry.

In May 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad delivered a letter to the United States presidency via the Swiss embassy in Tehran.  An Iranian spokesperson said that the letter contained "new solutions for getting out of international problems and the current fragile situation of the world."  Hopes for a positive shift in relations, and particularly, as regards Iran's controversial nuclear program, were quickly dashed when United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice dismissed the letter.  Rice said, "There's nothing in here that would suggest that we're on any different course than we were before we got the letter." The White House likewise noted that there was nothing in the letter that substantially addressed its concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions. 

On June 1, 2006, an agreement was reached regarding a unified approach by the world's most powerful countries to Iran's burgeoning nuclear program.  The agreement was forged during a meeting in Vienna, Austria and was attended by the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and the United States -- all of whom are United Nations Security Council permanent members. The meeting also included the foreign minister of Germany as well as the European Union foreign policy chief. 

The unified approach called on Iran to stop sensitive nuclear research and apparently included both penalties and incentives.  The actual details of the "carrot and stick" plan were not immediately disclosed because officials said that the proposal package had to be first presented to Iran for consideration.

Nevertheless, British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett said, "We are prepared to resume negotiations should Iran resume suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities as required by the IAEA and we would also suspend action in the Security Council." Beckett also warned, "We have also agreed that if Iran decides not to engage in negotiation, further steps would have to be taken in the Security Council ... We urge Iran to take the positive path and to consider seriously our substantive proposals which would bring significant benefits."

In the past, Russia and China had opposed punitive measures against Iran while the United States has said that if Iran refused to halt its nuclear enrichment activities, it would be referred to the United Nations Security Council.  The current climate of consensus was, thus, quite a shift in positioning for all three countries. 

In the case of the United States, its shift in stance may have been motivated by the need for unwavering Russian support.  As such, the United States agreed to the language in the draft United Nations Security Council resolution that would foreclose an immediate threat of military strikes against Iran. United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had a day earlier announced that Washington was offering direct talks with Tehran, noted that if talks or sanctions did not work, however, military options remained on the table.  Still, the State Department appeared to be conveying the message that it was willing to moderate its position in order to move the negotiations with Iran forward. Officials in Washington were also urging Iran not to make a quick reactive decision, instead calling on Tehran to examine not only the proposal package forged by the joint powers, but also to consider what might seriously be regarded as a policy shift from the White House. 

By June 2, 2006, the message from Washington was not entirely unified when the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, said in an interview with the British media (BBC Radio) that Iran could have a nuclear bomb ready within 10 years. He also accused Iran of being a state sponsor on terrorism.  It was not clear whether or not this message had been coordinated with the top officials at the White House. 

There was no immediate response by Iran to the news of the proposal package.  Instead, on June 2, 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad  said that Tehran would not relinquish its right to nuclear technology as a result of Western pressure.  It was essentially the same message that the Iranian leadership had been articulating for some time and so there was some worry that the new approach may have been an exercise in futility. But United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan reportedly called President Ahmadinejad to personally ask him to consider the proposal at hand.  As well, European Union foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, was expected to personally deliver the proposal to the Iranian government. 

A few days later,   Ahmadinejad said in a public speech that although he would not bargain away Iran's independence, he did intend to examine the plan to determine whether or not it fit with the national interest.  He also said, "We will not pass judgment on the proposals hastily."  The Iranian president's public statement that serious consideration of  the proposal would be given marked a departure his previously unequivocal stance. 

On June 6, 2006,  Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, characterized the proposal package at hand as "constructive" and said that it contained both "positive steps" and "ambiguities." Larijani also said that Europe had rightfully tried to resolve the nuclear impasse diplomatically.  He also noted that Iran was open to the resumption of talks aimed at finding a fair and rational solution.  The language used by the Iranian negotiator was deemed to be encouraging, even conciliatory, and generally free of the customary rhetoric that had previously led to headlines around the world. Western diplomats expressed satisfaction with the encouraging nature of Iran's initial response.

On June 12, 2006, the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  was set to debate Tehran's controversial nuclear development program.  The IAEA board was also expected to examine the most recent report on Iran by the Director-General, Mohammed ElBaradei. Iran's envoy to the IAEA called for a "constructive debate" just as members of the United Nations nuclear watchdog group prepared to meet in Vienna.  The envoy also asked that there not be any "repetitive allegations," which might cause a deterioration of the situation at hand.

At the close of August 2006, a report by the United Nations (U.N.) nuclear watchdog group, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stated that Iran ignored the deadline to cease work on its nuclear program.

Findings from the IAEA report, which was yet to be officially released, said that Iran continued  to enrich uranium well past the deadline for which such nuclear activities should have stopped.  Indeed, a source familiar with the report apparently suggested that Iran commenced a new phase of uranium enrichment just ahead of the August 31, 2006 deadline. The leaked report further asserted that Iran had not satisfactorily met the assessment requirements of the IAEA regarding the country's nuclear program.  To that end, the report stated, "Iran has not addressed the long outstanding verification issues or provided the necessary transparency to remove uncertainties associated with some of its activities." 

That said, there was no conclusive evidence ensconced in the report that Iran's nuclear program was "of a military nature," or oriented toward weapons development and proliferation.

Iran's intransigence on the nuclear issue was manifest recently in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's repeated declaration that his country would not bow in any way to international pressure.  Iran has insisted that its nuclear program has been developed for peaceful purposes, despite allegations by the United States (U.S.) that Iran was attempting to develop nuclear weaponry.

John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., said that the IAEA report offered clear evidence of the untenable nature of Iran's position.  For his part, U.S. President George W. Bush has often warned that Iran would suffer consequences for continuing its nuclear activities in the face of IAEA restrictions. To this end, the U.S. has advocated  the imposition of sanctions against Iran -- a measure that would require consensus among the veto-wielding permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. 

Since the passage of the deadline to halt enrichment activities in conjunction with the IAEA report, France -- one of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council --   expressed regret about Iran's unyielding stance. French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin said, "We cannot accept that Iran does not respect commitments it has made in the past."  Whether or not France's regret over Iran's refusal to halt its nuclear activities would translate into a vote in favor of sanctions, as demanded by the U.S., was yet to be determined.  Meanwhile, there was little sign that Russia and China -- two other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council -- had shifted their shared position that the mode of response be characterized by patience, rather than punishment.

With Iran's nuclear program at the forefront of the international purview, Javier Solana, the European Union (EU) foreign policy chief, was to convene meetings in Germany on September 9, 2006 with Ali Larijani, the chief nuclear negotiator for Iran.  That date would precede scheduled negotiations between multilateral Western parties and Tehran on a proposed package of incentives for Iran, aimed at halting its nuclear activities.  It was not known whether this package would be well-received by Iran, given the fact the uncompromising position taken by the country's leadership.

On September 14, 2006, the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),  branded a United States government report on Iran's nuclear program to be "erroneous"  and "misleading."  The IAEA was referring to a leaked congressional report that apparently contained several distortions of the nuclear agency's own assessments regarding the nuclear development activities of Iran.  In particular, the IAEA said that a claim in the report regarding the removal of a safeguard inspector did not reflect the true nature of the situation.  In a protest letter sent by the IAEA, the contention by the congressional report that Inspector Chris Charlier was removed for  failing to  abide by "an unstated IAEA policy barring IAEA officials from telling the whole truth" about Iran was condemned as being "outrageous and dishonest." Equally significant, however, was the congressional report's assertion that Iran had enriched some weapons' grade uranium -- a direct contradiction of the IAEA's finding that only small amounts of uranium, enriched a lower levels, had actually been found.  

In October 2006, Iran rejected the demands by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany to suspend its uranium enrichment activities.  The six countries convened discussions in the United Kingdom regarding Iran's refusal to stop its nuclear activities and to consider the possible implementation of sanctions. For its part, Iran said via its Foreign Ministry, "The suspension is completely unacceptable and we have rejected it." Iran also dismissed the threat of sanctions, stating, "The threat of sanctions is an inefficient means to achieve a solution."

As a result of these latest developments, a debate at the United Nations was expected to take place.  At issue on the agenda would be possible measures to be undertaken under the aegis of Article 41 of Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which allows  the Security Council to employ non-military means, such as sanctions, to augment its decisions.  The nature of such action was likely to be the subject of heated debate.  Indeed, there has been no consensus among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany about what type of sanctions to impose on Iran.  While the United States has been in favor of punitive measures, Russia and China have said they would not support drastic action.

Denise Youngblood Coleman, Ph.D. Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc.