Summary
North Korea’s nuclear program, which has likely yielded at least two nuclear bombs, is a major ongoing issue in global security. The discovery of a secret uranium enrichment program in North Korea in 2002 lead to the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework, which was supposed to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program. Since then, representatives from the United States (U.S.), North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia have participated in ongoing negotiations known as the six-party talks with the aim of reaching an agreement to stop North Korea’s program in exchange for a package of economic and security incentives.
Although a provisional agreement was reached in September 2005, the talks were at an impasse. North Korea refused to participate until the U.S. lifts financial sanctions in place against its counterfeiting activities.
In July 2006, North Korea test fired a series of ballistic missiles, leading to a United Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolution condemning the tests and prohibiting U.N. member states from supplying North Korea with missile-related materials and technology. Despite international pressure to return to the six-party talks, North Korea was still refusing to return to the negotiations until its preconditions are met.
In October 2006, North Korea carried out an apparent test of a nuclear weapon. The international community responded to North Korea’s announcement with widespread condemnation and a punitive U.N. Security Council resolution endorsing financial and security sanctions.
December 2006 marked the resumption of multilateral talks regarding North Korea's controversial nuclear program. North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States indicated their return to the negotiating table after a year-long hiatus. While the news of the recommencement of six-party talks was welcomed, there was also a pervasive sense of caution. Experts conveyed limited optimism about the prospects of forging a resolution amenable to all parties. Indeed, the United States has consistently expressed vociferous opposition to the notion of North Korea being a nuclear power, while North Korea has been equally adamant about its need for nuclear weapons. These two absolutist positions have resulted in an impasse. The December 2006 talks ended inconclusively and multilateral talks resumed again in January 2007.
By February 2007, the multilateral discussions saw some progress. Of particular interest was an agreement reportedly requiring Pyongyang to shut down its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon over the course of the ensuing months, in lieu of aid, such as fuel oil provided by the United States and South Korea. The draft agreement, which had been drafted by Chinese, also called for the return of international inspectors to North Korea. Concurrence was forged days after talks began.
In June 2007, North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and, then, disable its nuclear facilities. North Korea also noted that it was inviting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to return to North Korea to monitor the closure of its nuclear program and facilities. To that end, IAEA inspectors were expected to visit North Korea on June 26, 2007, for the first time since their dismissal from that country in 2002.
These announcements came months after the Chinese drafted an agreement in February 2007 (as noted above), in which the closure of the reactor at Yongbyon would be secured, in lieu of heavy fuel oil that would be secured by other countries participating in the multilateral nuclear disarmament talks. The total amount of fuel oil -- one million metric tons -- appeared to more substantial that the original quantity discussed earlier in the year under the Chinese-brokered plan. In addition, diplomatic recognition and humanitarian aid benefits were included in the deal. Also included in the arrangement was the untangling of a financial dispute.
A new round of six-party disarmament talks, which has included North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States, commenced in July 2007.
In mid-July 2007, North Korea said that it shut down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and a team of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was monitoring the situation at there in order to verify Pyongyang's claim.
In October 2007, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and the North Korea's leader Kim Jong-il signed a joint declaration calling for a permanent peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula. The eight-point declaration set forth an agenda for international dialogue aimed at crafting a treaty, which would replace the existing armistice that brought an end to the Korean War that took place from 1950 to 1953. The declaration also came on the heels of a significant announcement by North Korea that it would end its nuclear ambitions.
A year later in June 2008 North Korea declared its nuclear assets. In October 2008, the United States removed North Korea from its list of terrorism sponsors as part of the denuclearization agreement.
At the end of that year, it was clear that North Korea;s disarmament progress had stalled. Then at the start of 2009, the United States reacted by suspending energy aid to North Korea. Soon thereafter, relations devolved between the two Koreas when the South Korean leader said that aid to the North would be dependent on that country’s willingness to completely end its nuclear weapons program. North Korea accused South Korea of hostile intent and announced it was ending all political and military agreements with its neighbor to the south.
April 2009 saw North Korea take provocative action by launching a communications satellite into space via rocket. That claim was widely viewed as obfuscation of a missile test. On May 25, 2009, less than three years after the earlier underground nuclear test, North Korea conducted a second such test, arguing the merits of its right to a military deterrent. Days later, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the armistice that ended the Korean War.
Meanwhile, multilateral negotiations including North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States have remained stalled.
In the second week of June 2009, Russian officials warned that North Korea was close to test-firing another ballistic missile. Around the same time, the United Nations Security Council imposed harsh new sanctions against North Korea in response to the nuclear test carried out in May 2009. For its part, North Korea reacted to these developments by threatening to weaponize its stocks of plutonium.
On July 2, 2009, North Korea test-fired four short-range surface-to-ship missiles were fired into the Sea of Japan, which South Korea regards as the "East Sea." The missile tests were not surprising as Pyongyang issued warnings to shipping vessels, urging them to avoid coastal waters. Two days later, North Korea was suspected of firing another seven ballistic missiles. These seven Scud-type missiles were launched from an east coast base and, as before, fell into the Sea of Japan, also known as the East Sea. The timing of the missile tests coincided with the United States' celebration of its Independence Day on July 4, 2009, and was regarded as a clear act of defiance against Washington. Nevertheless, the United States was joined by Russia and China in calling for calm. Japan and South Korea said that the missile launches constituted an "act of provocation."
Background
The Korean peninsula has remained bitterly divided since the end of the Korean War in 1953. The demilitarized zone, which divides the two countries at the 38th parallel, is the world’s most heavily fortified border. In 1953, the U.S. and South Korea signed a mutual defense treaty that commits the U.S. to defend South Korea against external threats. The U.S. currently has 37,000 troops in South Korea and several thousand more that could easily be deployed from U.S. bases in Japan. North Korea has the fourth largest military in the world. During the Cold War, North Korea received substantial military aid from the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union.
North Korea was initially more economically developed than the South, largely due to its natural resources. However, the North’s policy of economic self-reliance (juch’e) created dismal economic conditions. Much of North Korea’s budgetary resources are devoted to the military. In the decades following the Korean War, South Korea’s export-driven economy grew rapidly. As a result, South Korea has a much higher standard of living than the North. After the Cold War, North Korea began to generate income through drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, and exporting weapons to countries like Syria, Iran, and Pakistan.
North Korea’s nuclear program became a serious international issue in the early 1990s. Although North Korea joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, its activities at its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon fueled suspicions that its nuclear program had non-civilian purposes. Despite signing the NPT, North Korea did not allow outside observers to inspect its nuclear facilities.
Past Initiatives
In 1992, North and South Korea issued the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in which both countries pledged not to "test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons." In response, the U.S. removed its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. The Joint Declaration was supposed to set up an inspections regime to monitor the compliance of both sides with regards to nuclear weapons. However, the declaration failed to end the nuclear dispute because North Korea denied International Atomic Energy Ahency (IAEA) inspectors access to some of its nuclear facilities, fueling more suspicions in the international community. The IAEA subsequently censured North Korea and referred the issue to the U.N. Security Council, which passed a resolution demanding North Korea’s compliance. After North Korea rejected the Security Council’s resolution, it banned IAEA inspectors from its facilities and announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Meanwhile, the U.S. formulated plans for a military strike against North Korea’s nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, where the U.S. believed North Korea was reprocessing enough plutonium to make several bombs. North Korea then agreed to negotiate greater access for IAEA inspectors.
In 1994, the U.S. and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework. Under the terms of the Framework, North Korea agreed to give up its plutonium program and allow IAEA inspections of its facilities in return for a package of incentives that included normalized diplomatic and economic relations with the U.S. The plan was to be administered by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an international consortium funded by the U.S., Japan, and South Korea tasked with constructing two light-water nuclear reactors and providing fuel shipments to meet North Korea’s energy needs.
The implementation process for the Agreed Framework was delayed from the outset. North Korea soon insisted that the nuclear reactors it was promised in the agreement not come officially from South Korea, which caused a delay as KEDO sought downplay South Korea’ role. In 1996, a North Korean submarine with 25 commandos came aground in South Korea. All were killed by each other or by South Korean forces. As a result, South Korea temporarily suspended its participation in the Agreed Framework. The U.S. also began to suspect that North Korea was developing an underground nuclear site in the late 1990s. In August 1998, North Korea tested its Taepodong-1 medium-range missile over Japan, sparking an international outcry. These incidents led the Clinton administration to delay lifting economic sanctions on North Korea as called for in the Agreed Framework. North Korea used these delays as proof that it was not the first party to violate the terms of the Agreed Framework.
In 2002, the U.S. confronted North Korea with evidence of a secret uranium enrichment program. North Korea acknowledged the existence of the program, which was in violation of its obligations under the NPT, the 1992 declaration, and the Agreed Framework. At first North Korea defended its right to have nuclear weapons, but then offered to dismantle its program in exchange for non-aggression pact by the U.S. North Korea charged that the U.S. had violated the terms of the Agreed Framework, as the two light-water nuclear reactors under construction were years behind schedule. North Korea then restarted operations at its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and subsequently withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and expelled IAEA inspectors. The KEDO executive board voted to suspend heavy fuel shipments and halt construction on the light-water reactors until the nuclear issue was satisfactorily resolved.
Current Initiative: Six-Party Talks
Since August 2003, the current negotiations about North Korea’s nuclear program have taken place in the context of the six-party talks in Beijing. Thus far, there have been five rounds of negotiations. The first round in August 2003 failed to resolve the issue, although the delegates agreed to meet again. The second round began in February 2004 and also ended without an agreement. In June 2004, the third round began, this time with the U.S. offering to provide fuel to North Korea in return for disarmament. On February 2005, North Korea announced that it possessed nuclear weapons and stated it had no intention of continuing to participate in the six-party talks. In July 2005, North Korea agreed to return to the talks. In August 2005, no agreement had been made and the talks adjourned for a recess until the following month.
In September 2005 the negotiations yielded a provisional agreement in which North Korea pledged to dismantle its nuclear program and rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In return, the other countries offered North Korea a package of economic, diplomatic, and security incentives, including a non-aggression pledge by the U.S. However, the agreement did not specify whether North Korea needed to do this before or after it received its package of incentives. In order to achieve a preliminary agreement and break the impasse, the countries that signed the agreement each released statements describing their respective understandings of the accord. North Korea subsequently claimed that it was under no obligation to dismantle its nuclear program or rejoin the NPT until it received the light-water reactors it had been promised under the Agreed Framework. The U.S., however, flatly refused to grant North Korea any such concessions until it completely dismantled its nuclear program, rejoined the NPT, and allowed for IAEA inspections.
In November 2005, the fifth round of six-party talks began. The U.S. and North Korea were unable to come to an agreement about what the terms of the September 20005 accord actually required of each party. North Korea’s has refused to participate in any more talks until the U.S. removes financial measures in place designed to sanction North Korea for its involvement in money laundering and counterfeiting.
After weeks of speculation, North Korea test fired at least seven short-, medium-, and long-range missiles in July 2006. Though the tests appear to have failed, they nonetheless provoked international condemnation. In mid-July, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution condemning North Korea for testing the missiles and demanded that it cease activities related to its ballistic missile program. The resolution also prohibits U.N. members from providing North Korea with missile-related goods and technology. The resolution passed unanimously only after a reference to Chapter Seven of the U.N. charter, which would have authorized sanctions or military action and would have been legally binding, was removed. Russia and China had opposed binding sanctions. The resolution also urged North Korea to return to the six-party immediately and without preconditions. North Korea rejected the resolution.
High-level talks between North and South Korean officials were cancelled as a result of the missile tests. South Korea suspended its shipments of food aid to the north, stating that they would not resume until North Korea made progress on the issues of the missile tests and its nuclear program. North Korea responded by suspending the visits of families separated across the DMZ. North Korea also cancelled plans to host a joint celebration of the anniversary of the Korean peninsula’s liberation from Japanese rule.
Also in July 2006, China froze North Korean assets in the Bank of China because North Korea continued to counterfeit Chinese currency. The move was tantamount to imposing economic sanctions on the regime, which China had previously not been willing to do.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expressed hope that the six-party talks would reconvene on the sidelines of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in late July 2006. When North Korea again refused to participate until the U.S. lifted its financial sanctions, the other five countries involved in the six-party talks, in addition to Malaysia, Canada, and Australia, met to discuss the issue on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting.
In October 2006, North Korea said that it intended to test a nuclear weapon. The international community, including China, strenuously urged North Korea not to do so. Nevertheless, North Korea carried out an apparent test of a nuclear weapon. The international community responded to North Korea’s announcement with widespread condemnation and a punitive U.N. Security Council resolution endorsing financial and security sanctions. Resolution 1718 called for the inspections on cargo going to and from North Korea to search for weapons, a ban on the sale or transfer of materials related to North Korea's unconventional weapons program, and a freeze on the transfer of funds connected with North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Absent from Resolution 1718 was the Chapter Seven [of the United Nations charter] provision, which would enforce the sanctions via military force. North Korea was also urged to return to multilateral talks.
For its part, however, the North Korean government in Pyongyang decried Resolution 1718, and warned that subsequent pressure by the United States would be regarded as "a declaration of war."
December 2006 marked the resumption of multilateral talks regarding North Korea's controversial nuclear program. North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States indicated their return to the negotiating table after a year-long hiatus. While the news of the recommencement of six-party talks was welcomed, there was also a pervasive sense of caution. Experts conveyed limited optimism about the prospects of forging a resolution amenable to all parties. Indeed, the United States has consistently expressed vociferous opposition to the notion of North Korea being a nuclear power, while North Korea has been equally adamant about its need for nuclear weapons. These two absolutist positions have resulted in an impasse. The December 2006 talks ended inconclusively and multilateral talks resumed again in January 2007.
By February 2007, the multilateral discussions saw some progress. Of particular interest was an agreement reportedly requiring Pyongyang to shut down its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon over the course of the ensuing months, in lieu of aid, such as fuel oil provided by the United States and South Korea. The draft agreement, which had been drafted by Chinese, also called for the return of international inspectors to North Korea. No concurrence was yet forged days after talks began.
On February 13, 2007, it was announced that concurrence had been reached. North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon within 60 days in exchange for 50,000 tonnes of fuel oil or economic aid of equal value, with 950,000 tonnes of fuel oil or equivalent received after further disarmament steps are taken. As well, both Japan and the United States agreed to discuss the possibility of normalizing ties with North Korea -- something that Pyongyang has been seeking for some time. The United States also said that it would work with North Korea to resolve a banking dispute, and it would consider the prospects of removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Yet to be seen was whether or not the agreement would be ratified by all six parties, and also whether or not North Korea would fully comply with the provisions of the deal. For example, the state news agency of North Korea issued a report referring to the "temporary" suspension of nuclear activities, rather than enduring disarmament. United States negotiator, Christopher Hill, warned that the resumption of nuclear activities in the future would be a clear violation of the agreement.
In the third week of June 2007, North Korea reportedly agreed to shut down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and, then, disable its nuclear facilities. North Korea also noted that it was inviting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to return to North Korea to monitor the closure of its nuclear program and facilities. To that end, IAEA inspectors were expected to visit North Korea on June 26, 2007, for the first time since their dismissal from that country in 2002.
These announcements came months after the aforementoned Chinese drafted an agreement in February 2007 in which the closure of the reactor at Yongbyon would be secured, in lieu of one million metric tons of heavy fuel oil that would be secured by other countries participating in the multilateral nuclear disarmament talks. The total amount of fuel oil appeared to more substantial that the original quantity discussed earlier in the year under the Chinese-brokered plan.
In addition, diplomatic recognition and humanitarian aid benefits were included in the deal. These perks included possible normalization of ties between North Korea and Japan and the United States respectively, as well as the removal of North Korea from the United States' list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Also included in the arrangement was the untangling of financial dispute. At issue has been several millions of dollars, which were frozen in a bank in the Chinese domain of Macao in 2005, after the United States claimed that the funds had been acquired through illicit means. The move resulted in several banks refusing to do business with North Korea out of fear of similar action being taken. As such, North Korea had been adamant about linking satisfactory resolution of the financial dispute with the aforementioned nuclear disarmament agreement. With the deal now moving forward, North Korea said that it would begin the process of shutting down operations at Yongbyon within weeks, pending receipt of the frozen funds. Russia, which worked to facilitate the complex transfer, said that the money was in the process of being delivered.
North Korea characterized talks with United States nuclear envoy, Christopher Hill, on these matter as being both "comprehensive and productive." Hill responded to the developments positively but noted that the closure of the reactor at Yongbyon was only the start of an ongoing process, and would not solve all the problems at hand. Hill also said that a new round of six-party disarmament talks, which has included North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States, would commence in July 2007.
In mid-July 2007, North Korea said that it shut down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. A team of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was monitoring the situation at Yongbyon in order to verify Pyongyang's claim. Nevertheless, the announcement was welcomed by the countries of the West, the wider world, and particularly by the countries participating in multilateral talks with North Korea aimed at disarmament.
In October 2007, North Korea said that it would end its nuclear ambitions. To that end, Pyongyang formally agreed to a timetable for the disabling of its nuclear facilities. Pyongyang also agreed to disclose details about its nuclear program by the close of 2007. North Korea was scheduled to surrender its stockpile of nuclear weaponry in 2008.
In October 2008, the United States removed North Korea from its list of terrorism sponsors as part of the denuclearization agreement.
At the end of 2008, it was clear that North Korea;s disarmament progress had stalled. Then at the start of 2009, the United States reacted by suspending energy aid to North Korea. Soon thereafter, relations devolved between the two Koreas when the South Korean leader said that aid to the North would be dependent on that country’s willingness to completely end its nuclear weapons program. North Korea accused South Korea of hostile intent and announced it was ending all political and military agreements with its neighbor to the south.
April 2009 saw North Korea take provocative action by launching a communications satellite into space via rocket. That claim was widely viewed as obfuscation of a missile test.
On May 25, 2009, less than three years after the earlier underground nuclear test, North Korea conducted a second such test, arguing the merits of its right to a military deterrent. Days later, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the armistice that ended the Korean War. Meanwhile, multilateral negotiations including North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States have remained stalled.
Special Entry:
North Korea conducts nuclear test in violation of UN Security Resolution 1718 and announces end of armistice; UN issues condemnation and a harsh sanctions regime
On May 25, 2009, North Korea said that it had successfully conducted an underground nuclear test. North Korea said that this test contained more explosive power than an earlier nuclear test conducted in 2006.
Several independent entities confirmed that a powerful explosion had been registered, resulting in the conclusion that it was caused by the nuclear test. Indeed, the United States Geological Survey said that a 4.7 magnitude seismic tremor was detected underground and indicated a nuclear explosion of some kind. As well, the Russian Defense Ministry was also reported to have said it detected the explosion. The actual location of the testing was unknown but South Korea noted that a seismic tremor had been detected in the north-eastern part of the country close to Kilju. This was the area where North Korea's first nuclear test had been conducted.
Geopolitical analysts were trying to determine why North Korea had chosen to move from negotiations to a clearly confrontational stance. Two years earlier, North Korea agreed to close its nuclear facility at Yongbyong and comply with international monitoring of its nuclear assets. In exchange, it was to be the recipient of a generous aid package. Later, however, North Korea withdrew from long-running multilateral negotiations and stopped inspectors from monitoring progress related to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
There was some speculation that after a woeful harvest, with up to a quarter of the North Korean population in desperate need of food aid, according to the World Food Programme, Pyongyang may have been trying to divert attention from this internal crisis. There was also some suggestion that the domestic worries may have prompted an internal power struggle, which ultimately may have spurred this action by hard-liner within the regime.
For its part, Pyongyang appeared to indicate its motive via a communique announced on state radio, which asserted that the underground nuclear testing had been "successfully conducted... as part of measures to enhance the Republic's self-defensive nuclear deterrent in all directions.” The statement went on to note that the test was intended to "contribute to safeguard the sovereignty of the country and the nation and socialism.” Pyongyang also offered assurances that the underground nuclear testing had ensued in a safe manner with advanced technology.
International news agencies reported that in addition to the underground nuclear test, North Korea also test-fired two short-range missiles. There were reports that the test firing of these missiles was aimed at disrupting the ability of United States’ surveillance of the nuclear testing.
The international community reacted with outrage and condemnation to these collective actions, which occurred just a month after North Korea test fired a long-range missile capable of reaching Asia as well as parts of the United States.
Crisis talks were convened by Japan and South Korea respectively. A spokesman for South Korean President Lee Myung-bak said that North Korea’s decision to conduct nuclear testing was a "grave challenge" to international non-proliferation efforts. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura deemed the path embarked on by North as "unacceptable."
United States President Barack Obama said that the action by North Korea was a threat to international peace and stability. He warned, “The danger posed by North Korea's threatening activities warrants action by the international community.” The American president observed that North Korea was "not only deepening its own isolation it's also inviting stronger international pressure.”
United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon Brown said North Korea’s nuclear activities "undermine prospects for peace on the Korean peninsula."
One of North Korea’s closest allies, China, joined the wider international realm in decrying the nuclear testing. The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement that read: "China expresses a resolute protest against new nuclear weapons tests carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in defiance of the objections voiced by the world community.” The Chinese government also demanded that North Korea to honor its obligations related to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the wider level China called for peaceful and calm dialogue to resolve the burgeoning crisis.
Another of North Korea’s closest allies, Russia, closed ranks with Western powers in denouncing North Korea’s actions. The chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, Viktor Zavarzin, echoed the words of United States President Obama. Zavarzin said, "The actions of the North Korean leadership can be described as threatening international peace and security. The whole world community should be involved in resolving this problem, in particular within the framework of the UN Security Council.”
Russia, which was at the helm of the rotating presidency, called for an emergency session of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, noting that North Korea had violated UN Security Council Resolution 1718.
In fact, the Russian Foreign Ministry categorically rebuked North Korea’s actions in a statement that read: “We cannot describe the North Korean move other than as a breach of UN Security Council resolution 1718, which prohibits Pyongyang from carrying out nuclear tests.” The statement continued, “The North Korean nuclear test has a serious impact on international efforts aiming to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and breaches the international regime provided by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty."
Indeed, UN Security Council Resolution 1718 exists in tandem with Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and compels compliance by all member states. A nuclear test would be an unassailable violation of UN Security Resolution 1718, which itself imposed sanctions in North Korea after it conducted a previous test in 2006.
Not surprisingly, the UN Security Council rapidly reacted with a strenuous statement of condemnation, registering North Korea’s contravention of the resolution, demanding that North Korea return to multilateral talks aimed at denuclearization, and reminding all member states that they must comply with sanctions imposed on North Korea. The UN Security Council also made clear that further action, in the form of a new resolution with stronger measures, was in the offing.
After the emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, Vitaly Churkin -- Russian envoy to the UN and the current president of the body -- made clear that work on the new resolution would start immediately. He said, "The members of the Security Council have decided to start work immediately on a Security Council resolution on this matter, in accordance with the Security Council's responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations."
United States Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, also said that the formulation of a new resolution with more stringent measures would commence right away. Rice said, "The US thinks that this is a grave violation of international law and a threat to regional and international peace and security. And therefore the United States will seek a strong resolution with strong measures."
On May 27, 2009, the North Korean military announced that it was abandoning the armistice that brought an end to Korean War. The North Korean military said that this action was being taken in response to South Korea's decision to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). North Korea said that South Korea's decision to join PSI -- a United States-led effort to patrol the oceans in search of nuclear weapons -- was tantamount to a "declaration of war" and promised military action if its shipping vessels were intercepted. In another development, South Korean media reported that steam had been observed emanating from North Korea's nuclear plant at Yongbyon -- a sign indicating North Korea had decided to recommence the manufacture of weapons-grade plutonium.
In the second week of June 2009, Russian officials warned that North Korea was close to test-firing another ballistic missile. The Russian military reportedly claimed that it had accessed information pertaining to the type of rocker to be launched although it was unaware of a specific launch date. This claim was somewhat supported by reports that North Korea warned shipping vessels to stay away from its east coast waters for a period for three weeks.
Meanwhile, the United States special envoy to North Korea, Stephen Bosworth, said in an address to the Korea Society in New York that his government was considering stronger responses to the challenges posed by North Korea’s recent missile activities. He said, "North Korea's recent actions to develop a nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile capacity require that we expand our consideration of new responses.” He continued, "However, the North Korean claim to be responding to a 'threat' or a 'hostile policy' by the United States is simply groundless. Quite to the contrary, we have no intention to invade North Korea or change its regime through force, and this has been made clear to the DPRK repeatedly.”
Among the possible responses being considered by the United States were financial sanctions, as well as tougher inspections of shipping vessels in waters surrounding North Korea. Related to these possible moves was the unanimous decision by the United Nations Security Council to impose harsh new sanctions against North Korea in response to the nuclear test carried out in May 2009. Included in the new sanctions regime was the expected provision for the increased inspection of North Korean cargo not only on shipping vessels, but also on land and by air, and it authorized the destruction of any materials suspected of being linked to weapons of mass destruction. The new sanctions regime also expanded the arms embargo against North Korea, effectively prohibiting the sale of heavy and small arms by North Korea.
Rosemary DiCarlo, the United States deputy ambassador at the United Nations said: "North Korea chose a path of provocation. This resolution will give us new tools to impair North Korea's ability to proliferate, and to threaten international stability." In a rare show of solidarity with the international powers against North Korea, China said the measures showed that the world opposed Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Indeed, Chinese ambassador Zhang Yesui said: "We strongly urge the DPRK (North Korea) to honor its commitment to de-nuclearization, stop any moves that may further worsen the situation, and return to the six-party talks." He also rebuked North Korea for jeopardizing regional security by carrying out the nuclear test.
For its part, North Korea reacted to these developments by threatening to weaponize its stocks of plutonium. United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that this threat by Pyongyang was both “provocative” and “deeply regrettable.” She warned that the move would serve only to isolate North Korea even further from the wider international community.
On July 2, 2009, North Korea test-fired four short-range missiles. According to South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, two surface-to-ship missiles had been fired from the port of Wonsan while the other two were launched from Sinsang-ni. All four were fired into the Sea of Japan, which South Korea regards as the "East Sea." The missile tests were not surprising as Pyongyang issued warnings to shipping vessels, urging them to avoid coastal waters. Two days later, North Korea was suspected of firing another seven ballistic missiles. These seven Scud-type missiles were launched from an east coast base and, as before, fell into the Sea of Japan, also known as the East Sea.
The timing of the missile tests coincided with the United States' celebration of its Independence Day on July 4, 2009, and was regarded as a clear act of defiance against Washington. Nevertheless, the United States was joined by Russia and China in calling for calm. Russia and China urged North Korea to return to the negotiating table and said all parties should work to avoid further destabilization of the region. The United States also said that the tense situation should not be exacerbated. Using highly restrained language, a United States Department of State official said the volley of missile tests were "not helpful" and said that North Korea should not "aggravate tensions" but instead "focus on denuclearization talks." While British Foreign Secretary David Miliband echoed this sentiment by saying that tensions on t he Korean peninsula should remain "at manageable levels," Japan and South Korea struck a somewhat harsher tone in saying that the missile launches constituted an "act of provocation."
Foreign Policy Positions of Key Players
North Korea -
After the Cold War, North Korea has felt a greater degree of insecurity because it is no longer has access to Soviet military aid. Thus, its nuclear program can be seen as a security investment. North Korea has also felt threatened by what it views as an aggressive U.S. foreign policy. Having been included in President Bush’s "axis of evil" speech and having witnessed the policy of preemption implemented in Iraq, North Korea may view its nuclear program as a way to guard against a U.S. attack. Some observers, however, argue that North Korea’s real agenda is to blackmail the international community into giving it the resources it needs to prevent economic collapse, thereby ensuring the regime’s survival. North Korea has demanded that negotiations take place in a bilateral context with the U.S. In June 2006, the day after Washington announced that it would be willing to hold talks with Iran over its nuclear program, North Korea invited U.S. envoy Christopher Hill to Pyongyang. North Korea has stated that it will not participate in the six-party talks again until the U.S. removes financial sanctions currently in place against its counterfeiting and money laundering operations, which have caused banks around the world to avoid dealing with North Korea. North Korea also wants the U.S. to provide a light-water nuclear reactor before it dismantles its nuclear program. The September 2005 agreement only stated that the issue of the reactors would be addressed at an "appropriate time." In July 2006, North Korea caused an international stir when it test fired seven missiles, and again in October 2006, when it apparently joined the "nuclear club." Ties with the broader international community deteriorated further as a result, however, progress on nuclear disarmament presented a significant shift from 2007 through 2008. As noted above, since 2009, North Korea has moved from negotiations to confrontation.
South Korea -
Since 1998, South Korea has pursued a "sunshine policy" of diplomatic and economic engagement with North Korea. Although South Korea has reason to fear a nuclear-armed North Korea, it nonetheless aims to prevent the regime’s collapse, which it believes would produce a flood of refugees across the border and destabilize the security of the region. As a result, South Korea has been reluctant to apply sanctions or cut off its economic aid. South Korea prefers a less confrontational and less coercive strategy that places an emphasis on business investment. South Korea currently operates industrial complexes inside North Korea that it hopes will demonstrate the benefits of economic liberalization. The U.S. opposes continued aid and investment because it does not feel that South Korea adequately links such economic benefits to North Korea’s progress on human rights and nonproliferation. South Korea has offered the North large amounts of electricity as an incentive to disarm. Following the July 2006 missile tests, South Korea suspended its food aid to North Korea and said that it would only resume if North Korea made progress on the missile tests and nuclear issues. South Korea welcomed the new sanctions against the North following the nuclear test of October 2006. Ties between North Korea and the international community deteriorated further as a result, however, progress on nuclear disarmament presented a significant shift from 2007 through 2008. As noted above, since 2009, North Korea has moved from negotiations to confrontation, which it blames to some degree on South Korea's new leader, who has taken a more hardline approach in dealing with the North. See above for details.
United States -
The crux of U.S. strategy toward North Korea is to encourage North Korea’s neighbors in the region to place pressure on the regime. The George W. Bush administration has remained largely skeptical of South Korea’s sunshine policy and has argued that the Agreed Framework amounted to extortion. The Bush administration has demanded that North Korea completely abandon its nuclear program before it receives any concessions. The U.S. has also rejected North Korea’s calls for direct bilateral negotiations, although informal discussions between the two countries have occurred on the sidelines of the six-party talks. The U.S. currently has sanctions in place against financial institutions who have dealings with North Korean companies suspected of counterfeiting U.S. currency and money laundering. In May 2006, there were rumors that the U.S. would be willing to pursue bilateral talks on the subject of a peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice even while six-party negotiations were still ongoing.Ties between North Korea and the broader international community deteriorated further as a result of an October 2006 nuclear test, however, progress on nuclear disarmament presented a significant shift from 2007 through 2008. As noted above, since 2009, North Korea has moved from negotiations to confrontation with the United States backing strong international action in response.
China -
As North Korea’s only ally in the region, China possesses an enormous ability to influence North Korea’s behavior as a result of the economic and energy assistance it provides. Like South Korea, however, even though it seeks to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, China is reluctant to put too harsh of penalties on North Korea for fear that the regime will collapse and destabilize the region. China worries that the North Korean program could spark a regional arms race. In addition, China fears that it could lose its influence on the peninsula if the regime were to collapse as a result of military action or sanctions, especially if the U.S. or South Korea took charge in the interim. During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s April 2006 visit to the U.S., President Bush urged China to exercise its "considerable influence" over North Korea to coerce the country back to the bargaining table. China has repeatedly urged North Korea to reform its economy. Kim Jong-Il has made several trips to China to tour high-tech centers with the aim of learning how a communist country can liberalize its economy while still maintaining an authoritarian regime. In July 2006, China froze North Korean assets in its banks because North Korea continued to counterfeit Chinese currency. Like Russia, China joined the condemnation of the nuclear test of October 2006, and did not veto the U.N. resolution endorsing financial and security sanctions against North Korea, although it lobbied for the exclusion of enforcement through military means. Ties between North Korea and the broader international community deteriorated further as a result of the nuclear test, however, progress on nuclear disarmament, thanks to a Chinese-brokered initiative, presented a significant shift from 2007 through 2008. As noted above, since 2009, North Korea has moved from negotiations to confrontation. While China has, to date, been a strong ally of North Korea and has eschewed harsh responses from the international community, it has nonetheless issued strong condemnation of North Korea's latest (as of 2009) actions.
Japan -
Japan sees North Korea as a major security concern, especially after North Korea tested a long-range ballistic missile over Japan in 1998. Another major ongoing sticking point in Japanese-North Korea relations is the issue of North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. However, despite Japan’s security concerns, it has been willing to engage in talks with North Korea about normalizing relations. Japan has also expressed a willingness to provide a substantial aid package as part of a broader agreement in part to compensate for its actions during its colonial occupation of the Korean peninsula prior to 1945. In February 2006, North Korean and Japanese officials met for formal talks on the normalization of diplomatic relations, economic assistance, and the fate of Japan’s kidnapped citizens. To a large extent, the U.S. and Japan share similar positions on the North Korean issue. Following the July 2006 missile tests, Japan requested an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council and encouraged its members to adopt a strong resolution condemning the tests and to apply sanctions. Japan took a similar approach following the events of October 2006. Ties between North Korea and the broader international community deteriorated further as a result of the test, however, progress in negotiations and denuclearization presented a significant shift from 2007 through 2008. As noted above, since 2009, North Korea has moved from negotiations to confrontation, resulting in condemnation from Japan, which backs international action in response.
Russia -
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was one of North Korea’s most significant allies, providing the regime with extensive military and economic aid. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia went to considerable lengths to downgrade its strategic relationship with North Korea as it sought economic ties with South Korea. Perhaps in an attempt to expand its influence in East Asia, Russia has been an eager participant in the six-party talks. Russia believes it should play a significant role in the negotiations because, unlike the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, it has normal diplomatic relations with both sides of the dispute. However, since Russia has ceased providing North Korea aid, its actual leverage over Pyongyang is arguably somewhat limited. China is a much more significant trading partner with North Korea. Russia, like China and South Korea, aims to prevent the collapse of the regime in the North because of fears of a mass exodus of refugees across the (short) Russian border. Russia is against applying sanctions toward North Korea, believing that sanctions will not change the regime’s behavior nor achieve a negotiated settlement. Moscow has encouraged Washington to engage in direct talks with Pyongyang. Following the July 2006 missile tests, Russia expressed its disappointment, but said that the tests were within North Korea’s legal rights. Like China, Russia joined the condemnation of the nuclear test of October 2006, and did not veto the U.N. resolution endorsing financial and security sanctions against North Korea, although it lobbied for the exclusion of enforcement through military means. Ties between North Korea and the broader international community deteriorated further as a result of the nuclear test, however, progress on nuclear disarmament, thanks to a Chinese-brokered initiative, presented a significant shift from 2007 through 2008. As noted above, since 2009, North Korea has moved from negotiations to confrontation. While Russia has, to date, been a strong ally of North Korea and has eschewed harsh responses from the international community, it has nonetheless issued strong condemnation of North Korea's latest (as of 2009) actions.
Written by Denise Youngblood Coleman Ph.D., Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc., and Ryan Holliway, Researcher Associate, CountryWatch Inc.
Sources: BBC, Reuters, Agence France Press, NYT, San Francisco Chronicle, Washington Post, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, International Crisis Group, Brookings Institution