Summary
For fifteen years, Somalia has suffered a devastating civil war between rival clans and has had no functioning central government. Despite over fourteen initiatives by the international community to establish a unity government, the current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has been chronically unable to assert its authority across the country. In June 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) dramatically expanded its territorial control of Somalia, including the city of Mogadishu, with the blessing of the Somali business community. Ongoing internal instability in Somalia has been exacerbated by geopolitical tensions throughout the region. The United States (U.S.), Eritrea, and Ethiopia, among other countries, have backed competing factions within Somalia, raising concerns that the conflict could become a wider regional war and further destabilize the horn of Africa. Many observers also worry that Somalia, whether plagued by anarchy or ruled by an Islamist regime, could become a safe-haven for terrorist groups, much like Afghanistan after the Soviet occupation ended. Efforts by the United Nations (U.N.), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union, and the Arab League to mediate the conflict have thus far failed to initiate productive negotiations between the fledgling Transitional Federal Government and the increasingly powerful Islamic Courts.
Background/Context
Three interconnected conflicts currently contribute to the unstable security situation in Somalia: internal Somali political turmoil that led to the collapse of the government in 1991, Ethiopian-Somali tensions over the Ogaden region, and Ethiopian-Eritrean tensions that have fueled a growing proxy war.
1969-1991
Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre seized power and became president in a bloodless coup in 1969. Siad Barre headed the Supreme Revolutionary Council, which held a socialist ideology and established a close alliance with the Soviet Union. President Siad Barre had irredentist ambitions of unifying ‘greater Somalia’, including the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, which was predominantly populated by ethnic Somalis, though was nonetheless under Ethiopian control as a result of colonial geopolitics. Relying extensively on Soviet military aid, Somalia greatly expanded its military capability, having been previously outnumbered by Ethiopian forces.
In the mid-1970s, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) began waging a separatist insurgency in the Ogaden region with the support of Somalia. In July 1977, the Somali military invaded Ethiopia to assist the insurgents, hoping to exploit domestic turmoil in Ethiopia as an opportunity to seize Ogadan. The Soviet Union decided to switch its support to Ethiopia after its attempt to mediate a ceasefire failed. The Soviet Union subsequently put in place an arms embargo against Somalia, while Somalia responded by severing its diplomatic ties to Moscow. With a massive influx of Soviet arms and Cuban troops, Ethiopia recaptured its seized territory. Somali forces retreated back to Somalia in March 1978. The WSLF continued to carry out limited attacks against government targets in Ethiopia, though its capacity in this regard was extremely weakened. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), another dissident separatist group, began to undertake insurgent activities against Ethiopia. Somalia, abandoning its socialist ideology, turned to the West for international support, military equipment, and economic aid. Somalia reached a military agreement with the United States to allow American forces the use of certain Somali military bases.
Following the Ogaden war, a broad range of opposition movements and ethnic groups challenged the authority of the Siad Barre regime. Throughout the 1980s, Somalia became increasingly fragmented as more and more groups sought to overthrow the government. Siad Barre violently suppressed the insurgent threats to his regime. As early as 1979, a group of dissatisfied military officers formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). In northern Somalia, the Issaq clan became increasingly discontented with Siad Barre and formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) in Hargeisa with the stated goal of overthrowing the regime. In January 1989, Somalis from the Hawiye clan formed an opposition group called the United Somali Congress (USC) in Rome. In 1988, as part of a strategy to use violent force to counter the insurgencies, the Somali National Air Force bombed Hargeisa, killing over 10,000 insurgents and civilians. In late 1989, Mohamed Farah Aideed, who had previously been imprisoned as a political prisoner, formed a military wing of the USC. With Ethiopian support, Aideed formed alliances with the SNM and other opposition groups. As a result of the insurgencies, Somalia faced an economic crisis that became worse as Siad Barre and his cronies stole from the national treasury. The United States, alarmed by the severity of Siad Barre’s violent response to its opposition groups, began to distance itself from his regime.
Beginning in 1982, Kenya and Djibouti made diplomatic efforts to mediate talks between Ethiopia and Somalia. In 1986, Siad Barre met with his Ethiopian counterpart and expressed his desire to defuse the tensions along the border, which stemmed from the combined pressures of escalating insurgent activity, overt Ethiopian military threats, drought, and the destabilizing presence of Ethiopian refugees. In 1988, Ethiopia and Somalia signed a peace agreement and reestablished diplomatic relations. Both countries agreed to withdraw troops from their mutual borders and cease support for insurgent groups seeking to overthrow the respective governments in Ethiopia and Somalia.
By the end of the 1980s, the insurgency in northern Somalia spread to the central and southern regions of the country. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes and became refugees in neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. The Somali army disintegrated as members rejoined their respective clan militias. The territorial control of Siad Barre’s regime was reduced to the immediate area surrounding Mogadishu. In December 1990, as USC and SNM forces advanced toward Mogadishu, Siad Barre lost control over his own militias. In January 1991, Siad Barre was driven from power and the central Somali government completely collapsed. The resulting chaos caused the loss of thousands of lives and the displacement of over two million Somalis. A severe drought made conditions in the country worse.
1992-2004
After the collapse of the government, a civil war broke out in Somalia between a faction supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and another supporting General Mohamed Farah Aidid. In 1992, General Aideed formed the Somali National Alliance (SNA) with four other Somali factions. The SNA, the first inter-clan and inter-factional political alliance, initially controlled most of southern Somalia. The U.N. Secretary-General dispatched an envoy to Somalia to meet with faction leaders, who expressed their support for a U.N. peacekeeping role in Somalia to facilitate humanitarian relief. Somaliland, in northern Somalia, declared its independence, though it has not been recognized as such by the international community.
In January 1992, the U.N. Security Council imposed an arms embargo against Somalia. In cooperation with the Organization for African Unity (now the African Union) and the Arab League, the U.N. Secretary-General organized talks between the factions, who agreed to a ceasefire that would be monitored by U.N. observers. U.N. security personnel would protect humanitarian convoys. A national reconciliation conference would be held under U.N. auspices to establish a new central government. In April 1992, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 751, which established the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) to fulfill these functions. However, the ceasefire was largely ignored. Continued fighting and insecurity jeopardized UNOSOM’s mission. Militias controlled by warlords controlled various parts of the country, occasionally forming alliances. Relief workers were constantly under attack, hampering their ability to deliver badly needed food supplies to the 1.5 million Somalis at immediate risk of famine. Widespread looting of aid supplies, robbery, armed banditry, and anarchic political conditions further constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Only a trickle of relief supplies actually reached those in need.
Recognizing the increasing inability of UNOSOM to carry out its mandate, the U.N. Security Council authorized a more robust mission, called the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to take over the U.N. presence in Somalia in December 1992. UNITAF was made up of contingents from 24 countries and was led by the U.S. The U.N. Security Council authorized the use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” Approximately 37,000 troops were deployed to southern and central Somalia. In March 1993, the U.N. Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council that stated that the presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and the successful delivery of humanitarian assistance. Despite the improvement, the Secretary-General stated that a secure environment had not been established in the country and that there was still no effective functioning government, civilian police force, or national military. The Secretary-General recommended transitioning UNITAF to UNOSOM II, which would have a mandate to seek the restoration of peace, stability, law, and order through disarmament and political reconciliation. UNOSOM II was tasked with “providing assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali state based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.” The Security Council adopted the Secretary-General’s recommendations in March 1993
Later in March 1993, the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Representatives from fifteen Somali political movements in additional to several neighboring countries, and several international and nongovernmental organizations attended the conference. The representatives unanimously adopted an Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia. The agreement consisted of four parts: disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property and settlement of disputes, and transitional mechanisms. The Somali parties agreed to put an end to the armed conflict and resolve their differences through peaceful political means. International donors pledged over $130 million towards the implementation of the agreement, which was estimated to cost $166.5 million.
It soon became clear that General Aideed’s faction, though it had signed the March 1993 agreement, had no intention of cooperating with U.N. disarmament efforts. General Aideed, viewing the peacekeepers as a threat to his power, orchestrated attacks on U.N. forces and, in June 1993, killed 25 Pakistan soldiers. According to the U.N., the bodies of the victims were mutilated and subject to other degrading forms of treatment. The Secretary-General and the Security Council strongly condemned the attack and ordered the arrest of those responsible. The U.S. put a bounty on Aideed and authorized U.S. troops to see to his arrest. In October 1993, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, leading to the withdrawal of American forces from Somalia in March 1994. France, Belgium, and Sweden also announced their intention to withdraw their troops from the U.N. mission. Although UNOSOM continued to make some progress even after the U.S. withdrawal, including building a small police form and judiciary, the Secretary-General said that without effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords in Somalia, it would not be possible for the country to enjoy lasting peace and security.
In February 1994, the U.N. Security Council extended the mandate of UNOSOM to help implement the Addis Ababa Agreements, but authorized a gradual reduction of the U.N. force. The security situation continued to deteriorate, bringing nearly all humanitarian operations in Somalia to a standstill for several weeks at a time. A national reconciliation conference scheduled to take place was repeatedly postponed. UNOSOM was disbanded in March 1995 due to a lack of progress on political reconciliation and dwindling support from member states.
As UNOSOM prepared to withdraw from Somalia, General Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohammed signed a peace agreement to promote national reconciliation through a power-sharing deal between the two factions. They also signed agreements to jointly administer the Mogadishu airport and seaport. In June 1995, Aideed declared himself the interim president of Somalia and attempted to take Somalia’s seat at an Organization of African Unity meeting, but was denied on the grounds that a legitimate Somali government had not yet materialized. Aideed was later killed in 1996.
In December 1997, all but two factions met in Egypt to sign the Cairo Declaration, which established a thirteen-member council of presidents, a prime minister, and a national assembly. The agreement failed to improve conditions because supporters of Hussein Mohamed Farah, General Aideed’s son, and Ali Mahdi objected to the proposed settlement. At this time, economic conditions in the country worsened as a result of drought and pests. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states banned imports of Somali livestock because of concerns about an epidemic. In 1998, Puntland, in northeastern Somalia, declared itself an autonomous region.
In April and May 2000, the Somali National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti resulted in the formation of a transitional government. In contrast to past peace conferences, warlords did not dominate the conference. Clan elders, women, intellectuals, and civil society groups who represented a broad geographic distribution of Somali society attended the conference. A Transitional National Assembly and a Transitional National Government came to power in Mogadishu in November 2000 with a three-year timetable to draft a new Somali constitution and create institutions of governance. Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, Siad Barre’s former interior minister, became the interim president.
In April 2002, a group of warlords in southwestern Somalia took control of six districts and declared the “Southwestern Regional Government.” That year, the U.N. expressed concern that violence throughout Somalia was worsening. U.N. humanitarian workers were attacked and kidnapped, which led the U.N. to halt humanitarian operations in Mogadishu. In September 2002, a cabinet meeting of the Transitional National Government was interrupted when militants invaded the building and opened fire. The transitional government continued to exercise little control of Somalia, especially in Mogadishu. Peace talks were scheduled to be held in Kenya in mid-September 2002, but were later postponed until October. Kenya’s special envoy said that the main objective of the peace talks was to construct a viable state with structures, institutions, and enterprises that would facilitate the creation of a decentralized unity government. More than 20 warlords participated in the conference.
In July 2003, after holding negotiators in Kenya with international mediators, representatives of many Somali factions proposed a plan for a new, federal government. The plan called for the establishment of a federal government; a transitional parliament of 350 members; a parliament-appointed president; and a president-appointed prime minister. In January 2004, another peace conference was held in Kenya. A government plan emerged, in which the transitional parliament would consist of 275 members chosen by clad leaders and warlords. Despite the agreement, violence continued throughout Somalia.
In October 2004, Interim President Yusuf requested that foreign peacekeeping enter Somalia to help support the TFG. In January 2005, members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with the exception of Eritrea, endorsed the request and pledged to send troops and equipment to assist the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). In February 2005, the African Union Peace and Security Council also endorsed the deployment of peacekeepers. President Yusuf’s request for foreign troops was quite controversial among several factions of the TFG. Many Mogadishu-based cabinet members and parliamentarians left the TFG in March 2005 in protest. In July 2005, the African Union Peace and Security Council requested that the United Nations Security Council grant an exemption to the arms embargo in order to allow an IGAD peacekeeping force to enter Somalia. The U.N. Security Council denied the African Union’s request.
When Mogadishu-based groups left the government in March 2005, they proposed the Mogadishu Security and Stabilization Pace (MSSP). The MSSP included an ambitious proposal to disarm and demobilize 1,400 militiamen, eliminate militia roadblocks and checkpoints across the city, and establish a municipal government. Though militiamen associated with the Islamic Courts were largely exempt from demobilization efforts, Islamists were active participants in the drafting of the plan. Though the MSSP has a broad base of support among civilians in Mogadishu, the plan ultimately failed as militias refused to demobilize.
Current Situation
In February 2006, the Transitional Federal Government convened inside Somalia for the first time since it was created in Kenya in 2004. For security reasons, the transitional government met in Baidoa rather than Mogadishu, which was experiencing a dramatic upsurge in violence. Despite the relocation, the transitional government remained paralyzed by bitter disputes over the presence of foreign peacekeepers, the location of the capital, and budgetary concerns. In March 2006, fighting broke out in Mogadishu between militias associated with the Islamic Courts, which had been trying to restore order, and the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-terrorism (ARPCT), a group of warlords backed by the United States. In May 2006, fighting between the two sides continued to escalate.
On June 5, 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts defeated the AFPCT and seized control of Mogadishu, marking the first time the city has come under the rule of a unified authority in fifteen years. In the aftermath, reports emerged that some Mogadishu-based warlords had shift their allegiance to the Islamic Courts in light of their victory. On June 15, diplomats in New York Formed the International Contact Group on Somalia, with the support of the U.S., U.K., Norway, Sweden, Italy, Tanzania, and European Union. The African Union, Arab League, and Kenya participated as observers. The group called for an immediate end to the fighting in Somalia and for talks between the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts. In late June 2006, the Islamic Courts created a new power structure. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, a radical cleric, was chosen to lead a legislative council. Sheikh Aweys had previously led al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, which the U.S. has labeled a terrorist group. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a more moderate cleric, was selected to lead the executive council.
Shortly after the seizure of Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts, Ethiopian troops were reportedly seen near Baidoa, where the Transitional Federal Government is currently operating. Somalia’s interim president Abdullahi Yusuf has longstanding ties to the Ethiopian government. Interim President Yusuf, despite international pressure, refused to hold talks with the Islamic Courts in July 2006, though he later reversed his position on the matter.
On July 13, 2006, the U.N. Security Council endorsed a measure to ease the arms embargo on Somalia in order to increase the leverage of the fledgling transitional government. The measure also allows for the possible deployment of peacekeeping forces.
In late July 2006, twenty cabinet ministers and deputy ministers resigned from the transitional government in protest of the president’s alleged support of the presence of Ethiopian troops and foreign peacekeepers. Although some members of the government wanted to convene talks with the Islamic Courts, the interim prime minister remained opposed to such an initiative. Members of the transitional government advanced a motion of no confidence in the prime minister. However, the no confidence motion narrowly failed.
Also in late July 2006, a cabinet minister Somalia's interim government was shot to death in the town of Baidoa, where the government has been seated. Mass protests ensued in the streets of Baidoa, complete with violence and vandalism. For its part, the Union of Islamic Courts, which increasingly took control of the capital city of Mogadishu, condemned the death of minister and denied playing any part in the shooting.
The Islamic Courts have since steadily increased their control of the country, including the key port of Haradere and the town of Beledweyne, which is strategically located near Baidoa near the Ethiopian-Somali border. The Arab League has attempted to sponsor talks between the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts, however the Islamic Courts have refused to participate in talks until Ethiopian troops leave Somalia. Thousands of Somalis across the country have taken part in demonstrations against the Ethiopian presence. Meanwhile, the United Nations Food Security Analysis Unit has warned a severe humanitarian crisis may erupt in Somalia, where insecurity could compound crop failures and leave 3.6 million people in need of urgent aid. According to the U.N., 1.8 million Somalis currently remain dependent on humanitarian assistance. Southern and central Somalia in particular face considerable risk of experiencing a famine.
Update
In mid-August 2006, Ethiopia said that Islamic militias were making disturbing gains in Somalia. Indeed, the Islamic militias, which had already taken control of key towns including the capital of Mogadishu, had advanced northwards toward Gaalkayo. Ethiopia also said that too much power was being placed in the hands of the chairman of the Union of Islamic Courts -- Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Ethiopia warned that the transitional Somali government was at risk of being made irrelevant, while the country fell into the hands of Islamist terrorists. A statement by a senior information official for the government of Ethiopia said, "Any move which would be detrimental to the national interests of the country [Ethiopia] would not be tolerated." This expressed statement evoked fears that the country would militarily intervene into Somali affairs, thus contributing to the possible outbreak of a full-scale war in the region.
Earlier, there were reports (noted above) that Ethiopian troops had entered into Somalia. There were other reports that six armored divisions of the Ethiopian army were deployed along the border -- presumably as a show of support by Ethiopia's government to the transitional Somalian government. With Islamist militias reported to be advancing in Somalia, it appeared that Ethiopia made good on its promise to intervene. Ethiopian troops were said to be moving toward the town of Baidoa -- the seat of the transitional government of Somalia -- on August 20, 2006. Ethiopia, which was aligned with the transitional Somali government, said that it would not allow Islamist militias to continue to hold sway in Somalia. For its part, the Somali transitional government denied the presence of Ethiopian troops in its jurisdiction.
In early September 2006, the situation shifted somewhat when Somalia's interim government forged an agreement with the Union of Islamic Courts to create a national army. The deal was reached following talks in Sudan that had been mediated by the Arab League. Those meetings were regarded as a positive development since they resulted in the first face-to-face discussions between the transitional government and the Islamists since June 2006. Another round of talks was scheduled for October 2006. At that time, the two sides were scheduled to flesh out details pertaining to power-sharing and security. Still, the existing agreement to form a national army was just one aspect of a larger concord, which included a pledge to eschew foreign aid, as well as joint recommitment to a previous truce.
The reference to foreign aid was specifically aimed at reducing the risk of intervention by other countries into the complex scenario in Somalia. At issue was the claim that the weakened interim government of Somalia was being aided by Ethiopian troops and equipment, for the purpose of staving off the advance of the Islamist militias into territory controlled either by warlords or the transitional government. But complaints about foreign intervention were also being levied by the Somali government. At the other end of the equation, there were increasing suggestions that arms were flowing to the Islamist militias in violation of an embargo. Some experts intimated that the weapons from Iran and some Arab countries were entering Somalia via Eritrea. Although the Eritrean government denied the charges that it was supplying arms to Islamist militias, the transitional government of Somalia reacted by declaring its support for an Eritrean rebel group, Eritrean Liberation Front.
As the interest groups entrenched themselves into opposing enclaves, anxieties increased about regional conflict in the region. Notably, observers began to speculate that Ethiopia and Eritrea were resuming their hostilities and using Somali terrain as the proxy for a return to war. The presence of Ethiopian and Eritrean military interests in Somalia served only to magnify the depth of the problem. In fact, according to the United Nations, there were more than 8,000 Ethiopian troops operating in Somalia as allies of the weak transitional government. Meanwhile, approximately 2,000 Eritrean troops were said to have been earlier deployed to Somalia to assist the Islamic Courts. With the risk of a regional conflict at hand, the agreement discussed above was viewed as very necessary to diffusing tensions.
On September 18, 2006, Somalia's President Abdullahi Yusuf survived an apparent assassination attempt when successive car bombs exploded at a time when the president's convoy were outside parliament in Baidoa. Over a dozen people were killed in the attacks, including the president's brother.
Because of President Yusuf's poor relations with the Union of Islamic Courts, which controlled most of southern Somalia, there were some suspicion that Islamic militants may have been responsible. The timing of the attacks, however, suggested that it would not have been in the interests of the Islamic militants to alienate the country's official leadership. Indeed, the bomb blasts occurred at a time when parliamentarians were to set approve a new cabinet, and more significantly, to debate the possible inclusion of the Union of Islamic Courts within government. Somali Foreign Minister Ismail Hurre underscored this point when he said that whomever was behind the attacks wanted reconciliation efforts with the Union of Islamic Courts to fail.
With questions still abounding about who might be responsible for the attacks, analysts drew attention to a threat by Baidoa's controlling warlord about ten days prior. Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade had warned that his forces would evict the government by force if they did not leave Baidoa voluntarily. Whether or not this warlord was responsible for the assassination attempt was not known.
Meanwhile, the Union of Islamic Courts consolidated its control of southern Somalia by taking control of the port city of Kismayo in the last week of September 2006. Most residents had already fled the city, and as the Islamic militants approached, government forces withdrew. There was no violence reported.
In October 2006, relations between Somalia and Ethiopia returned to the fore as a result of allegations that Ethiopian forces had attacked a Somali town. The Union of Islamic Courts accused Ethiopian troops of attacking the town of Bur Haqaba, located on the road between the seat of government in Baidoa and the official capital of Mogadishu (now held by the Islamists). As a result, the Islamists promised revenge in the form of a "holy war." Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a leader within the Union of Islamic Courts, said, "Heavily armed Ethiopian troops have invaded Somalia... They have captured Bur Haqaba. History shows that Somalis always win when they are attacked from outside." For its part, Ethiopia denied that its forces had traversed the border into Somalia.
The tensions between the Islamists in Somalia and Ethiopia saw no reprieve in the following months. By December 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts issued a seven-day deadline to Ethiopia, warning that if Ethiopian troops were not withdrawn from Somalia, they would face imminent attack. Ethiopia responded by denying that its soldiers were fighting in Somalia, saying instead that hundreds of its forces were simply assisting the transitional government. In fact, Islamists and government forces -- apparently aided by Ethiopian troops -- were ensconced in fierce clashes in mid-December 2006. Ethiopia's head of government, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi dismissed the deadline and the possibility of attack, noting that such threats were nothing new.
On December 24, 2006, Ethiopia openly admitted that it was carrying out an offensive in Somalia. The government of Ethiopia acknowledged that its troops were battling militias from the Islamic Courts. Berhan Hailu, Ethiopia's Information Minister, said in an official statement that his country's military had been deployed into Somali territory for the purpose of "self-defensive measures." To this end, Hailu noted, "The Ethiopian government has taken self-defensive measures and started counter-attacking the aggressive extremist forces of the Islamic Courts and foreign terrorist groups." His remarks were regarded as a significant break from previous statements by Ethiopia, which mostly consisted of a variety of denials about its activities in Somalia.
Now, the reality on the ground in the border areas between Somalia and Ethiopia was characterized by heavy fighting. In addition to the fierce battles apparently taking place between the Islamists and the government forces, there were also reports of massive air strikes and shelling by Ethiopian fighters upon Islamist-held towns. The Union of Islamic Courts promised to push back the advancing Ethiopian troops.
Despite the Islamic Courts' calls to foreign fighters to join in the "holy war" in Somalia against Ethiopia, the situation on the ground was intensifying. Days later, the conflict was spreading past the border regions and deeper into Somali territory. There were conflicting reports about the number of people apparently killed in the fighting.
By December 28, 2006, Ethiopian forces had advanced deep into Somali territory and were now approaching the capital city of Mogadishu. With imminent attacks upon them, Islamist forces abandoned Mogadishu after holding control over the city for several months. Reports issued by the Associated Press indicated that some members of the Islamist militias were abandoning their duties and pledging their allegiance to elders in the city. There were also reports of gunfire throughout the city and looting of buildings that had been used by officials of the Union of Islamic Courts.
At the close of 2006, the transitional government of Somalia, aided by Ethiopian forces, had control of Mogadishu. Islamist militias had fled the city, with many of their ranks heading toward the southern city of Kismayo -- one of their few remaining strongholds. Ethiopian troops were following the Islamists and moving toward Kismayo as well. Islamists then quickly retreated from Kismayo, even as thousands of civilians fled the port city amidst fears of violence. Such anxieties had been heightened when news spread that there had been violent clashes between Ethiopian troops and Islamists in the area of Jilib, to the north of Kismayo.
At the start of 2007, members of the Islamist militias were moving toward the border with Kenya. The transitional government of Somalia called on Kenya to close its borders. The Kenyan government responded by saying that it would convene a summit of East African countries to consider how to deal with the emerging crisis.
Even with the Islamists on the run and with the transitional government now retrieving some of its power, thanks to Ethiopian military support, the situation in Somalia promised to be challenging. The government was still faced with the prospect of reaching some sort of agreement with the Islamists, or risk continued destabilization in a country that had not seen peace and security for years. While the transitional government called for talks with the Union of Islamic Courts, the Islamists said that no dialogue was possible until Ethiopian forces exited Somalia. Indeed, the presence of foreign troops in Somalia was a matter of controversy among locals with divided loyalties. As a result, Ethiopia promised to depart quickly from Somalia.
In an interview with the British media in mid-January 2007, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia said that his country's forces were set to begin its withdrawal from Somalia. The Ethiopian leader said, "We want to withdraw at the earliest possible opportunity but we want to do it in a responsible manner."
For its part, the transitional government of Somalia was expected to concentrate on diplomacy in the first part of 2007. At issue was the matter of negotiations with the ousted Islamists and warlords. Such negotiations were aimed at bringing these disparate and rival factions into government, for the purpose of stabilizing the country and in the interests of long-term peace.
Meanwhile, the African Union (AU) was set to discuss a plan by which it would deploy a peacekeeping force to Somalia, which could eventually be replaced with United Nations peacekeepers at some point in the future. Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf had earlier called for a "speedy deployment" of peacekeepers to his country. While the United States offered to provide $10 million in funds toward the creation of peacekeeping force that would operate under the aegis of the African Union, few countries initially pledged to send troops to Somalia. The European Union, however, joined the fray in the second week of January 2007, saying that it might send its own peacekeeping force to Somalia.
At an AU summit at the close of January 2007, Somalia's leadership agreed to host a reconciliation conference. Left to be seen was whether or not President Abdullah Yusuf would invite clan and religious leaders to the table for reconciliation. Such movement toward reconciliation would allow the European Union (EU) to release funding that could be used toward funding peacekeeping force in Somalia. External players, such as the EU, the United States and the United Nations, urged that moderate Islamists be included in the reconciliation process and ultimately, within a future government.
In February 2007, the northern part of Mogadishu was hit by five mortar bombs, leading to the deaths of at least three people, and injuries to several others. It was the latest manifestation of violent attacks presumed to be carried out by ousted Islamist hard-liners.
In the last week of February 2007, Mogadishu's main airport, where the Ethiopian troops were based, came under mortar fire. With the country still plagued by unrest, the Somali government welcomed the news that the Nigerian army would deploy soldiers to Somalia as part of an AU peacekeeping force in mid-April when the Ethiopian forces were expected to leave.
In March 2007, an ambush on African Union (AU) peacekeepers in Somalia led to a gun battle, and the subsequent deaths of 10 civilians. The ambush occurred at a main intersection in Mogadishu just as the first peacekeepers in more than a decade arrived in the violent Somali capital city. The Defense Department said that the attack would not deter the peacekeeping mission, and that an investigation into the matter would commence. In another incident, insurgents fired mortars at the airport during the welcoming ceremony for 800 AU troops from Uganda.
Heavy fighting plagued the Somali capital of Mogadishu in late March 2007 between troops and Islamist rebels. The bloody conflict led to many civilian deaths, with some estimates noting that the death toll might be in the hundreds. In fact, the Red Cross noted that it was the worst spate of violence in Mogadishu in 15 years. Accordingly, hospitals were over-taxed as they attempted to deal with hundreds of casualties.
One African Union (AU) peacekeeper was among those killed the flare of violence. AU forces arrived in Somalia a month prior to replace outgoing Ethiopian troops, which entered the country in late 2006 to help the weak transitional government assert its authority over the ascendancy of Islamist rebels. While the Ethiopian troops managed to drive the Islamists from the country, in recent weeks, they appeared to be carrying out renewed attacks in Mogadishu. In response, the transitional government, backed by Ethiopian forces, said that it was launching an offensive against Islamist militias. That offensive had evolved into the ongoing bloody violence now plaguing Mogadishu.
April 2007 saw Somalia hit by a wave of rampant violence. On April 20, 2007, reports suggested that clashes between Ethiopian-backed government troops and insurgents, made up of both Islamists and militants from the Hawiye clan, were so violent that approximately 130 people had been killed and over 200 had been injured. Days later, the violence was ongoing. By April 22, 2007, reports noted that scores more people had died and that hospitals were being taxed by the casualty lists. One day later on April 23, 2007, Mogadishu was the site of heavy shelling as Ethiopian-backed government forces continued their fight with insurgents. Many people were now trapped in their homes, unable to leave for fear of being hit by shelling. Still more deaths were recorded on that day, taking the death toll to more than 250. Reporters said that corpses littered the streets of the capital.
But Mogadishu was only one site of the violence. Kismayo in the south saw fighting between rival clans, with the Marehan taking control, to the detriment of government forces.
Meanwhile, people were being displaced as they fled the bloodshed and violence plaguing Mogadishu. In recent months, up to 320,000 people fled the capital to escape the devolving situation with many headed toward the border with Kenya. As noted above, still others were trapped in their homes, unable to leave for fear of being hit by shelling. The medical situation was quickly deteriorating as the number of casualties increased. Aid workers and agencies warned of a looming humanitarian crisis as a result.
On April 24, 2007, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for an immediate end to the fighting, as well as the convening of talks between opposed factions.
Early June 2007 saw a bomb attack carried out against Somalia's prime minister. A suicide bomber drove a vehicle packed with explosives into the home of Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi in Mogadishu. Several people died and 10 people were injured as a result. The prime minister, however, was unhurt. It was at least the third attempt of his life by would-be assassins since 2005 when he returned to Somalia. Prime Minister Ghedi accused Islamic militants linked with the terrorist enclave of al-Qaida of trying to destabilize Somalia. To this end, he said, "The terrorists wanted to discourage the government and Somali nation, but they will never succeed."
Meanwhile, violence was ongoing elsewhere in the country. In a market in Bakara, a grenade was thrown as a police patrol. Police responded in that case as well by opening fire. One woman waiting for a bus was killed as a result.
The interim government blamed ousted Islamists and renegade gunmen from the dominant Hawiye clan for the situation and imposed a curfew intended to curb the violence. However, many Somalis responded by accusing the government of allowing security forces to carry out indiscriminate violence against them. Overall, the landscape in Somalia continued to be characterized by lawlessness, instability and strife, despite efforts to move the country toward peace.
By July 2007, the Somali capital of Mogadishu continued to be plagued by violence despite anticipated peace and reconciliation talks set for July 15, 2007. Indeed, the capital was being hit by an upsurge in violence, as exemplified by daily bombings, heavy shelling and shooting attacks in areas frequented by civilians. In one case, two people died when a mortar bomb hit their house; in another case, shootings were reported at the main market at Bakara. The Ethiopian troops, who backed the fragile interim government and ousted the Union of Islamic Courts, as well as the government itself, were also being particularly targeted.
The general state of chaos spurred grave doubts about the success of the upcoming peace and reconciliation summit. The situation was not helped by the fact that several key figures, including leading Islamists and tribesmen, refused to participate. Nevertheless, in anticipation of that event, President Abdullahi Yusuf met with delegates from the African Union, Kenya, the European Union, and various European countries, who were informed about security plans for the summit. The delegates also met with elders from the Hawiye clan, however, there was no indication about whether or not clan representatives would attend the talks. As well, there was no confirmation about attendance by the Islamic Courts, despite the expressed view by Westerners and political experts that the reconciliation conference would be relateivly useless without that group's participation.
On August 18, 2007, a clan elder was killed just outside his home in the Somali capital of Mogadishu by three gunmen. Known as a leader within the dominant Hawiye clan of Somalia, Maalim Harun Maalim Yusuf had played a central role at a reconciliation meeting that ensued a month earlier.
The incident was something of a shock to Somalis who, despite their familiarity with lawlessness throughout the years, have not seen many incidences involving direct assassinations of clan elders. Indeed, such tribal figures have typically been beneficiaries of an unspoken code of reverence. Speaking about the killing, Haji Abdi Iman, a senior representative for the clan, said: "I don't care who committed this heinous crime but I can say this is a black day for the supporters of peace because he a dedicated negotiator despite his old age." Violence erupted in the Horuwa district of Mogadishu following the shooting, with insurgents firing mortars at security forces.
Apart from the immediate effect on the streets of Mogadishu, the apparent assassination of Maalim Harun Maalim Yusuf was expected to have a negative impact on the anticipated peace summit, discussed above.
In mid-October 2007, two Ethiopian soldiers died as a result of a car bomb in the Somali town of Baidoa, which has often functioned as the seat of government in a country plagued by violence and lawlessness. Reports on the ground suggested that the actual target was an Ethiopian military post located close to the hotel where Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi was staying. As such, there was speculation that the bombing was motivated by factions opposed to the Ethiopian-supported interim government of Prime Minister Ghedi. To that end, there was claim of responsibility from an Islamist insurgent commander that was broadcast on a radio station in Mogadishu. In that broadcast, the Islamist leader said that the attack was an attempted assassination. Soon thereafter, authorities raided the radio station, arrested journalists and the station manager, and ordered the radio station be shut down.
In the background of these developments was a meeting between Prime Minister Ghedi and President Abdullahi Yusuf, which was expected to be tense. The two men -- the head of government and head of state respectively -- disagreed on whether or nor the current term of government should end in October 2007 or two years later. While the president favored an imminent end to the government on constitutional grounds, noting that it was formed three years prior, the prime minister has said that the charter legalizing the mandate was signed only one year ago and this would end in 2009. Meanwhile, parliament was set to table a motion on the matter.
On October 29, 2007, Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi resigned from office. Gedi's resignation appeared to have stemmed from his failure to stop the resurgent Islamic militias from carrying out an insurgency against the already-fragile interim government. As well, he was faulted for his plan to augment the weak Somali government by involving Ethiopian troops. It was a move that appeared to incite the Islamic militias even further. Gedi resigned following a meeting with President Abdullahi Yusaf Ahmed.
In the background of these developments was the ongoing tension between Prime Minister Gedi and President Abdullahi Yusuf, as noted above. With Gedi resigning from office, it was apparent that the president had gained the upper hand.
Gedi was succeeded by Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein in November 2007, and was generally regarded as more of a neutral figure than Gedi, who had close ties to Ethiopian authorities and refused to negotiatie with opposition groups, including the Islamists. Hussein was a member of the largest clan in Somalia -- the Hawiye -- and his background included a career as a policeman and a stint as the head of the Somali Red Crescent organization.
A week after Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi resigned from office amidst charges that he failed to stop the Islamic insurgency, the Somali capital of Mogadishu was embroiled in heavy fighting between Ethiopian troops (in Somalia to back the fragile government) and Islamic militants. Several Ethiopian soldiers and even more civilians were reported to have been killed in the violence, in which Islamic militants were using guerilla tactics to carry out their attacks. However, the Islamic militants were not the only forces involved in fighting with Ethiopian troops. There were also reports of local Mogadishu residents opening fire on Ethiopian forces, suggesting that the presence of foreign forces in Somalia was taking a toll.
At the start of November 2007, the Somali capital of Mogadishu was embroiled in heavy fighting between Ethiopian troops (in Somalia to back the fragile government) and Islamic militants. Several Ethiopian soldiers and even more civilians were reported to have been killed in the violence, in which Islamic militants were using guerilla tactics to carry out their attacks. However, the Islamic militants were not the only forces involved in fighting with Ethiopian troops. There were also reports of local Mogadishu residents opening fire on Ethiopian forces, suggesting that the presence of foreign forces in Somalia was taking a toll.
Meanwhile, the violence was having a real effect on the ground as several thousand residents were displaced from their homes as they tried to escape the barrage of bullets. As well, the fighting prevented the transportation of goods, ultimately resulting in the depletion of fresh food supplies in the city. As such, aid agencies warned of a looming humanitarian crisis. The United Nations warned that 1.5 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance of some kind. By the second week of November 2007, tens of thousands of residents of the Somali capital of Mogadishu were fleeing the violence, which left scores of people dead in the space of only a week.
In the first week of July 2008, the head of the United Nations Development Program in Somalia was killed in the Somali capital city of Mogadishu. Osman Ali Ahmed was reportedly shot as he departed from a mosque after evening prayers in the southern Bulohube district; he subsequently died at a hospital in the area. His death was the most recent casualty in a spate of violent attacks by Islamists against key officials in Somalia. Only the day before, an explosion in Mogadishu left a Somali official, his wife, and several others dead. Days later, two men were shot in separate incidents in Mogadishu. Mohamed Mohamud Qeyre, the deputy director of a local aid organization linked with the German aid group, "Bread for the World," was killed in one case. In the second case, an employee of an aid group tied to the United Nation's World Food Programme was shot and seriously injured. In addition, an aid worker was killed in Galharei town in central Somalia and a driver for the World Food Programme was killed at a checkpoint in the same period.
In response, humanitarian aid agencies were considering withdrawing their workers from Somalia due to the devolving state of security in already-lawless and volatile Somalia. Meanwhile, there was no confirmation as to who was responsible for the attacks. There was speculation that some power brokers were unhappy that humanitarian agencies were providing aid to Islamic insurgents and, as such, might be to blame. But Islamic insurgents have in the past attacked Somalis working with foreign groups and, thusly, could also be considered possible suspects.
A roadside bombing in the Somali capital of Mogadishu left at least 20 people dead and close to 50 wounded in early August 2008. Most of those killed with women who were cleaning the streets. There was no claim of responsibility, however, roadside bombs have become something of a hallmark tactic of Islamic insurgents in their struggle against the Ethiopian-backed transitional government.
The latter part of October 2008 saw heavy fighting between Ethiopian-backed government troops and extremist Islamist insurgents in the Somali capital city of Mogadishu. At least 20 people were reported to have been killed in clashes, while dozens more were wounded. In a single case, five people died when a mortar hit their house. It was the most intense fighting in Mogadishu in several weeks.
Elsewhere in Somalia, a humanitarian aid worker from the United Nations World Food Programme was shot to death as he exited a mosque in the town of Merka. His death was the latest in a spate of assassinations in Somalia that appeared to specifically target air workers.
In December 2008, Somali President Abdullahi Yusef removed Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein from office on the grounds that the head of government had failed to end the conflict between hostile factions, effectively leaving Somalia without a functioning government and as something of a failed state.
The move by the president came at a time when the United Nations was trying to broker peace talks with the Islamists militants. To that end, Hussein said that his removal from office was part of the president's plan to undermine the United Nations-sponsored peace negotiations. The prime minister's position was bolstered when African Union Commission leader, Jean Ping, condemned the president's decision to have Hussein removed from office.
Days later, the Somali parliament gave a vote of confidence to Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein, declaring his ouster by President Abdullahi Yusef to be illegal, and effectively reinstating him into office. For his part, the president said he would abide by the parliament's decision.
The power struggle between the president and prime minister did not fade quickly from the public purview. Indeed, the East African regional bloc, Inter-governmental Authority (IGA), said that it would impose sanctions on Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed for his autocratic move to remove Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein as the head of government. IGA made clear its support for Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein and expressed regret over the president's attempt to oust the head of government from office. In a written communiqué, IGA stated, "[IGA] regrets the attempts by President Abdullahi Yusuf to unconstitutionally appoint a new prime minister that Iga does not recognize, and decides to impose sanctions on him and his associates immediately."
Also on the table for discussion was the matter of peacekeeping troops in Somalia at a time when Ethiopian troops were soon expected to exit Somalia. Indeed, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin said that his country had made the "irrevocable" decision to soon pull back its approximately 3,000 troops from Somalia.
Accordingly, there was an imminent need for some sort of stabilizing force in Somalia, given its status as a quasi-failed state with a paralyzed government, and a dismal security situation on the ground, with Islamic militants on the offensive. To that end, the African Union (AU) decided to convene a crisis meeting among its Peace and Security Council to discuss a future peacekeeping force in Somalia. African Union Commission leader, Jean Ping, noted that Nigeria, Burundi and Uganda had indicated some willingness to contribute limited troops to the Somali cause.
By the close of December 2008, as increasing blame was being placed on him for deepening the country's political crisis, Somali President Abdullahi Yusef Ahmed resigned from office. For his part, he placed the blame on the international community for not doing enough to bolster Somalia's transitional government in its fight against Islamist rebels. The outgoing head of state said in an address to parliament, "Most of the country was not in our hands and we had nothing to give our soldiers. The international community has also failed to help us."
Meanwhile, Parliamentary Speaker Adan Mohamed Nur called for unity in the face of the president's resignation. He also said, "I have received and accepted the resignation letter of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. I congratulate the president for the bold step he has taken in respect of the transitional federal charter." According to law, with the president's resignation accepted, the country's parliamentary body had 30 days to elect a new president by secret ballot. In the interim, the Parliamentary Speaker was to serve as president.
Even as Somalia's embattled transitional government was involved in its own power struggle, the start of 2009 saw the government's nemesis -- Islamic militants -- dealing with their own battle for supremacy. Indeed, rival Islamist groups, who control most of southern Somalia, were ensconced in violent clashes around the town of Guriel. The violence left more than 30 people dead and scores more injured. The internal Islamist conflict appeared to have been motivated by the impending withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. With a power vacuum at hand, various Islamist wings -- hardliners and local militias -- were in a power struggle of their own as they aimed for supremacy and influence. Notably, the Islamist group, al-Shabaab, has opposed a peace deal with the transitional government of Somalia. Al-Shabaab was in a fight to take control of areas, like Guriel, which were being vacated by outgoing Ethiopian troops.
On January 12, 2009, the Somali capital of Mogadishu was the site of violent clashes between Somali government troops and Islamic insurgents. There were reports of fatalities as the Islamists shelled the presidential palace where African Union peacekeepers were in talks with Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein. Government troops responded forcefully by firing mortars, which ultimately struck a marketplace and residential district.
According to Ethiopia's Information Ministry, as of late January 2009, about 3,000 Ethiopian troops completed their withdrawal from Somalia two years after crossing the border to help the embattled Somali government fight against Islamist insurgents. While Ethiopian troops appeared to have left Mogadishu, surrounding areas, and the southern part of the country, locals in the town of Baidoa --the seat of the transitional government -- said that Ethiopian troops remained there.
Meanwhile, despite the success of the Ethiopian troops in helping the Somali government repel the Islamists in 2006, in the years since that time, the religious extremist militias have regained much strength and terrain. With fears rising that the exit of Ethiopian troops would lead to further instability in already strife-ridden Somalia, approximately 3,400 African Union peacekeepers were expected to operate in Somalia.
At the political level, the government and moderate Islamic groups were convening power-sharing talks in Djibouti, aimed at expanding parliament (from 275 seats to 550) for the purpose of including these moderate opposition forces. Also on the agenda for Somali lawmakers in neighboring Djibouti was the election of a new president. That matter would follow the decision to expand the size of the Somalia's Transitional Federal Parliament, in order to include former rebel opponents, such as members of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS).
On January 30, 2009, the newly-expanded Somali parliament elected their new head of state. With the ballots counted and after two rounds of voting, Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed was elected president. A moderate Islamist who studied at universities in Sudan and Libya, Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed was the leader of the Union of the Islamic Courts (UIC). The UIC has been composed of clan-based Islamic Shari’a courts, which ruled large swaths of southern and central Somalia in the second half of 2006. This movement gained ascendancy at the time when warlords were accused of oppressing local residents, but was ousted when Ethiopian troops allied with the Somali government against Islamist forces. Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed soon fled to Kenya but it was his decision to split with a hard-line cleric, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, that largely contributed to his recent political foray. Indicating his moderate credentials, President Ahmed pledged good relations with neighbors, including Ethiopia, which helped oust him from power a few years earlier.
Two weeks after Somalia welcomed its new president and head of state, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed,a new prime minister was selected. The new head of government, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmerke, was the son of former Somali President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke who served the country as leader in the 1960s but was assassinated only two years after coming to power. The younger Shermarke served as Somali ambassador to the United States during the tenure of former Somali president Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed and worked for the United Nations in Sudan's Dafur region. His nomination would have to be confirmed by a vote in the country’s newly enlarged legislature.
Assuming that process transpires as expected, Shermarke was to form a National Unity Government, as stipulated in the power-sharing agreement between the transitional government and the Islamist opposition faction, whose leader (Ahmed) was recently elected as president.
In May 2009, Somalia's capital of Mogadishu was the site of renewed bloodshed and violence. Government forces and Islamic militants from the extremists enclaves, al-Shabab and Hisbul-Islam, were embroiled in street combat for several consecutive days.
Somalia's President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed placed the blame for the renewed bloodshed and violence on radical Islamists and hard-liners who were not interested in reconciliation and were prepared to take control of the country by force. In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Somalia's president said: "You see that the opposition is using the violence and killing and bloodshed, they don't want the violence in Somalia to end and the objective is to take the country by force." Indeed, the government's decision to accept Shari'a law in Somalia has done little to satisfy extremists Islamic militants. At the time of writing, at least 120 people were reported to have been killed.
By May 13, 2009, radical Islamists had advanced to the edge of the presidential palace in Mogadishu in the Wardigley district. Fighting was also reported to be taking place in the Bondere and Karan regions to the north of the city. Some of the government troops were said to have defected to the side of the militants, leaving remaining government troops and African Union forces confined to a narrow strip inside the capital city.
Days later, Somalia's President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed called on Islamist insurgents to negotiate a ceasefire as violence and fighting continued to plague the capital of Mogadishu. President Ahmed said in an interview with the BBC, "They see it lawful to shed blood. They aim to take over Somalia by force. We call on them to end the conflict by negotiating on our political differences." The president also said that tens of thousands of the city's residents were being displaced as a result of the chaos on the ground. To that end, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that up to 30,000 people have been forced to flee their homes in a mere one-week period.
These assertions found no resonance with Islamists who dismissed the overture. Islamist spiritual leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was at one time aligned with the president, summarily rejected the call for talks leading to a truce. Sheikh Aweys deemed the interim government and parliament to be unacceptable to the Somali people; he also suggested that the presence of African Union troops in Mogadishu was a sticking point for the Islamic militants. Another Islamist leader, Omar Iman Abou Bakr, further explained that their efforts [the Islamists' fight] had been successful and the only remaining soldiers fighting on behalf of the government were under the protection of African Union forces, who had no mandate to pursue Islamist insurgents. Thus, from his perspective, there was no incentive to enter negotiations.
By the end of May 2009, a senior insurgent commander who recently defected from the pro-government Islamist faction, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), to the armed opposition Hezbul Islam (Islamic Party), led by Sheikh Aweys, was gunned down in the streets of Mogadishu. His death came at a time when Somali government forces and insurgent Islamist fighters were in a bloody battle for control of the Somali capital. Then at the start of June 2009, several Somali policemen were killed while driving in the south of Mogadishu as a result of a roadside bomb blast. The back to back incidences of violence made clear that both sides of the conflict were vying for domination.
Somalia's location on the north-eastern edge of Africa with the Gulf of Aden to the north separating it from the Arabian peninsula, and the vast and highly-trafficked Indian Ocean to the east makes it a country of vital strategic interest on the global scene. Lawless Somalia, which is widely regarded as a failed state, has had no functioning government since 1991. Once controlled by warlords, Somalia is now under the governance of a weak Western-backed government, which has been forced at times to operate outside of the capital city. Should that fragile Western-backed interim government fall, Somalia could come under the control of Islamic extremists with ties to the terrorist group, al-Qaida. Such a scenario would present a clear threat to global security.
Indeed, African Union (AU) envoy Nicholas Bwakira has warned that members of al-Qaida numbering in the hundreds were among the Shabab Islamist group. Bwakira rejected the notion of AU forces withdrawing from Somalia on this basis saying, "It would be unacceptable that Shabab/al-Qaida take over government in Somalia. This is a group of war criminals." The United Nations envoy to Somalia, Ahmed Ould Abdallah, has not fully endorsed this course of action. He has advocated the removal of Somali Islamists, including Aweys, from terrorism "watch lists," in order to further negotiations and progress on the peace process.
As alarm over the situation in Somalia increased, neighboring countries urged the United Nations to impose a blockade on air strips and sea ports, in order to prevent the Islamists from procuring weapons and strengthening their fighting forces. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Igad) also called on international vessels, which were charged with searching for pirates, to enforce the blockade. Igad also identified Eritrea as a possible target for blockade as well, charging that the country has aided Somalia Islamists in acquiring weapons and training insurgents.
In mid-June 2009, three Somali officials were assassinated within days of one another. In one case, politician Mohamed Hussein Addow was killed by gunmen in Mogadishu. The area Addow represented -- the Karen district of northern Mogadishu -- had been the site of fierce fighting between government forces and extremist Islamists for over a month. In a second case, a police commander was killed. The most high profile assassination occurred was that of National Security Minister Omar Hashi Aden. The cabinet minister was killed in a suicide car bomb attack as he was leaving the Medina Hotel in central Beledweyn. A number of other government officials were killed in the attack, including Abdelkarim Farah Laqanyo -- Somalia's former ambassador to Ethiopia. Also among the dead were 20 more people, most of whom were locals and community elders who were meeting the minister and the other government officials.
In an interview with the media, Somali President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed characterized the attack as a foreign invasion of Somalia. He also publicly accused the radical Islamist group, al-Shabaab, of being behind the assassination of the minister who as a key member of the Somali government had been trying to mobilize government forces to fight the growing militant Islamic insurgency. The president's claim was not likely to become one of factual debate since the extremist movement, al-Shabaab, which has been linked with al-Qaida quickly claimed responsibility for the attack. Indeed, a spokesman for the group, Sheikh Ali Mohamoud Rage, said an al-Shabaab fighter carried out a "martyrdom operation."
It should be noted that in recent months, both al-Shabaab and Hezbul Islam have been carrying out attacks on Somali government forces and African Union peacekeepers in Mogadishu. In fact, the day before Security Minister Aden was being assassinated, close to fifty people had died and more than a hundred others were wounded as fierce battles ensued between Islamic militants and joint Somali government and African Union forces. Then, on the very day of Security Minister Aden's assassination, at least 10 people died and 20 others injured by a mortar bomb blast at a mosque in Mogadishu. It was not known at the time of writing who was responsible for firing the mortar, but it occurred as Islamic militants were fighting joint Somali government and African Union forces. Further deaths occurred as shelling by government forces hit some people in the Bakara market of Mogadishu.
Commenting on the situation unfolding in Somalia, an official from the United Nations warned that Mogadishu was experiencing the worst violence and bloodshed in close to two decades of conflict and chaos. But whereas neighboring Ethiopia had been willing to help quell the violence and aid the government forces in repelling the Islamists in the past, it was no longer so willing to enter the fray. Indeed, Ethiopia made clear that it would not provide Somalia with military support in the fight against extremist Islamist insurgents, explaining that any military intervention would require some sort of international mandate.
Foreign Policy Positions of Key Players
Transitional Federal Government
Since its inception in 2004, the Transitional Federal Government has proved to be a weak political force in Somalia. Despite considerable international support, many Somalis do not hold it in high regard. The TFG has often been paralyzed by disagreements over the location of the Somali capital, clan rivalries, and the presence of foreign peacekeeping troops. Despite tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia over a war fought in the 1970s, the transitional government’s embattled president supports the presence of Ethiopian troops, though he currently denies that they are even in the country.
Union of Islamic Courts
The Union of Islamic Courts emerged out of a judicial system supported by the Somali business community to try to bring order to the country by imposing Islamic Shariah law. Despite the harsh penalties the Islamic Courts enforced, such as amputating the limbs of thieves, many Somalis were pleased to be governed by law and order after experiencing anarchy and warlordism for over fifteen years. Aside from addressing crime, the Islamic Courts assumed several responsibilities of government such as validating business transactions and overseeing weddings and divorce. The Islamic Courts want to promote Islamic law rather than clan allegiance, which fueled much of the internal turmoil in Somalia. The UIC has gradually expanded its area of control from central Somalia southward to Mogadishu. The UIC is now the most powerful political and military force in southern Somalia. The Islamic Courts have banned foreigners from Mogadishu, though many aid workers had already stopped working in the city because of security concerns. UIC Chairman Sheik Sharif Ahmed has tried to moderate the image of the UIC by disavowing any desire to establish a Taliban-style government and reaching out to the international community, though many question his sincerity. The UIC, which opposes the deployment of any peacekeeping forces, demanded that Ethiopian troops leave Somalia before it resumed negotiations with the Transitional Federal Government. The election of a president from its ranks has changed the dynamics somewhat, with the UIC now inside the political process, and in the fight against remaining insurgent Islamic groups outside the political process.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia is the most important foreign actor in Somali affairs. Since the 1978 Somali invasion, Ethiopia has attempt to influence the Somali politics to prevent another invasion. Ethiopia strongly supports the transitional government because it does not want to see an Islamist regime take power in Somalia, especially considering Ethiopia’s sizeable Muslim minority. There are reportedly upwards of 500 Ethiopian troops near Baidoa, where the transitional government is headquartered. Though the Ethiopian government denies having a military presence in the country, officials have indicated that they will not stand idly by if the UIC launches an attack against Baidoa. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), a terrorist group that it now associated with the Islamic Courts, carried out terrorist attacks in Ethiopia in the 1990s to promote the seccession of Ethiopian region of Ogaden. Through the 1990s, Ehtiopian troops intervened in the Gedo region to prevent the AIAI from using the area as a staging ground for attacks. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which has close connections to AIAI, has received support from Libya, Egypt, and Eritrea. Ethiopian forces have entered Somali territory several times since the country first descended into anarchy in 1991. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a destructive border war from 1998 to 2000 and have since backed rebel groups to destabilize each other. As noted above, Ethiopian troops entered Somalia to help the weak transitional government fight the Islamists. They have subsequently exited the scene and have expressed no desire to re-enter Somalia without an international mandate.
Eritrea
Eritrea has allegedly supplied arms to the Islamics, in violation of an arms embargo, according to the United Nations. In July 2006, an Eritrean airplane was reported to have landed in Somalia to deliver a shipment of landmines, bombs, and guns. The Eritrean government has vehemently denied exploiting the Somali conflict to wage a proxy war against Ethiopia and blamed the deteriorating situation “on misguided policies by external actors,” such as the U.S.
United States
The Bush administration has said that its foremost priority is to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe-haven for terrorists. The U.S. is worried that the Islamic Courts might give refugee to al-Qaeda operatives, who would be eager to establish a base of operations in an unstable, lawless country. The U.S. initially reached out to Somali warlords in 2002 with the hope that they would be able to provide intelligence about people suspected members of al-Qaeda in Somalia. Prior to its defeat, the U.S. provided support to the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), an alliance of various secular warlords. According to the International Crisis Group, the CIA was providing $100,000 to $150,000 a month in support to the ARPCT. The CIA hoped to capture or kill a handful of suspected al-Qaeda operatives believed to be hiding in Somalia who are associated with the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The U.S. has refused to confirm that it backed the ARPCT, though the presence of an American anti-terrorism task force in Djibouti has raised suspicions. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer has warned Ethiopia and Eritrea against using the situation as a proxy war, though the Islamic Courts have accused the U.S. of orchestrating the Ethiopian incursion into Somali territory. Critics of the U.S. effort to back the Somali warlords contend that the effort has empowered the very people the operation hoped to marginalize and discredited the U.S. in the minds of Somalis, who generally opposed the warlords. The U.S. has voiced support for a plan promoted by the Arab League to initiative negotiations between the TFG and the Islamic Courts.
Kenya
A U.N. panel responsible for overseeing the arms embargo on Somalia has criticized Kenya for being uncooperative. Kenya has denied the allegations, but has remarked that the situation is difficult because the transitional government needs all the support it can get to effectively govern. Kenya has worked to increase its security presence along its porous border with Somalia.
Kenya has also been criticized for failing to halt the smuggling of the drug khat, sales of which are used to purchase weapons.
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGAD has pledged to send peacekeeping troops to Somalia, but only when it is safe to do so. African military experts have drafted plans to deploy as many as 3,500 Sudanese and Uganda troops to Somalia by October 2006, depending on the political situation between the Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government. The Sudanese and Ugandan governments have agreed to fund the first ninety days of the peacekeeping mission, which is expected to cost $34 million.
African Union
The African Union has unanimously authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force to support the Transitional Federal Government. The African Union Peace and Security Council had urged that United Nations Security Council to revise the arms embargo on Somalia so that the Transitional Federal Government can better assert its authority across the country.
Arab League
The Arab League has attempted to pressure the Islamic Courts to enter talks with the transitional government.
United Nations
The United Nations Security Council has warned neighboring countries not to interfere in Somalia’ internal affairs and has threatened sanctions against countries who continue to violate the U.N. arms embargo on Somalia.
Note: See "Political Conditions" in Country Review for Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea for further details
Written by Ryan Holliway, Researcher and Writer, CountryWatch Inc. and Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc.
Sources: BBC, Associated Press, New York Times, Agence France Presse, International Crisis Group, U.S. State Department, United Nations Operation in Somalia/Unified Task Force, GlobalSecurity.org, Africa News