Summary
For twenty years, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has waged a brutal insurgency against the Ugandan government. Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, seeks to rule Uganda according to the Ten Commandments in the Bible. LRA rebels are currently scattered throughout northern Uganda, southern Sudan, and the eastern Congo. As part of its campaign, the LRA has kidnapped as many as 30,000 children and forced them to serve as child soldiers and sex slaves. LRA-committed atrocities have highlighted the deficiencies of the Ugandan government in protecting its citizens. The conflict has been exacerbated by geopolitical tensions throughout the region, as Sudan has provided refuge and support to LRA rebels in the past in retaliation for Uganda’s support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). In October 2005, the International Criminal Court issued arrested warrants for top LRA commanders for crimes against humanity. In response, the LRA has escalated its attacks against nongovernmental organizations, which has severely hindered the ability of relief groups to provide humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons throughout the country. Ugandan President Museveni has offered LRA commanders amnesty if they disarm. Despite the signing of truce in August 2006, talks between the government and the LRA in Juba, Sudan have yet to produce a comprehensive agreement to end Africa’s longest running conflict. See "Update" below for latest developments.
Background/Context
British colonial policies in Uganda created a north-south divide that has fueled much of the country’s post-independence political turmoil. As a result of British “divide and rule” tactics, the economic, political, and educational elites mainly came from southern Uganda, while the bulk of the military came from northern Uganda. Consequently, the Acholi and West Nile ethnic groups, which are located in the north, came to dominate the Ugandan military. When Uganda obtained its independence in 1962, the internal political-military dynamic from the colonial era created an unstable situation that lead to several coups.
In 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), which was mostly comprised of southerners, came to power with a comprehensive plan to overcome the turmoil that had characterized Ugandan politics since the country obtained its independence. Southerners had felt alienated in 1986 when the NRM came to power because the president the NRM deposed had been an ethnic Acholi. The Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) subsequently began an insurgency against the NRM in northern Uganda. After its military campaign failed, the UPDA signed the Gulu Peace Accord with the NRM in 1988. The peace accord gave amnesty to combatants and initiated discussions on a new constitution and a northern Uganda reconstruction program. Despite the peace agreement, NRM forces continued to wage a counterinsurgency campaign against remaining UPDA elements, in the process destroying much of the Acholi people’s economic resources.
In 1987, a new movement organized the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) emerged. Alice Auma Lakwena, a self-proclaimed spiritual medium, led the movement, which combined a strict interpretation of Christianity with traditional Acholi beliefs in spirits. Lakwena had joined the battle against the NRM in 1986, when she claims to have been ordered by a spirit to abandon her healing practices and rid Acholiland of the evil forces that had invaded it. The HSMF had a broad base of support that extended beyond the Acholi to the tribes of northern and eastern Uganda. At one point, before being defeated by the government, the HSMF came within 100 kilometers of Kampala, the Ugandan capital. Joseph Kony, who claims to be a relative of Alice Lakwena, then created the Lord’s Resistance Army, which fused the military tactics and objectives of the UPDA with the spiritual overtones of the HSMF.
In July 1990, the Addis Ababa Accord was signed, integrating the remaining elements of the UPDA into the Ugandan military (formerly the NRM). In 1991, the Uganda government launched Operation North, which aimed to end the rebel conflict in northern Uganda. According to Amnesty International, while locking down northern Uganda, the government expelled international nongovernmental organizations and committed human rights abuses. The operation generated resentment after the arrest of several popular politicians. Betty Bigombe, an ethnic Acholi and the Ugandan government special envoy to the north, established “arrow groups” – local defense forces armed mostly with bows and arrows. However, the LRA possessed more sophisticated weaponry and quickly defeated them. Kony considered the “arrow groups” an act of betrayal by the Acholi and subsequently ordered that Acholi civilians be brutally attacked as punishment. The Acholi people turned against the insurgency, but at the same time, resented the presence of government forces.
Having failed to defeat the insurgency militarily, President Museveni authorized Bigombe to being negotiations with the LRA for the first time in 1993. Though the peace negotiations seemed promising at first, a peace agreement failed to materialize. In 1994, President Museveni called off peace negotiations and declared a seven-day ultimatum for LRA members to surrender. That same year, the Sudanese government began funding the LRA as a proxy against the Uganda government, which was providing support to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The LRA established bases in southern Sudan, where other ethnic Acholi were located, shortly after Museveni issued the ultimatum. Sudanese support for the LRA changed the nature of the conflict because the Sudanese government was able to provide the LRA with a larger assortment of weapons. At that point, the LRA began using the gruesome tactics against civilians, including abducting children, that have been the subject of international notoriety. In April 1995, Uganda severed its diplomatic ties with Sudan.
In 1996, after President Museveni announced that the Ugandan government would move rural northern Ugandans into internally displaced person (IDP) camps to better protect them against the LRA. However, ethnic Acholi resented being forced by the government into such camps, which were crowded and unsanitary. The LRA managed to attack civilians inside the camps. In 2005, the World Health Organization released a report that said that at least 1,000 people die every week in IDP camps in Uganda from disease, violence, and starvation.
In 1997, members of the Acholi diaspora in Europe and Canada formed Kacoke Madi, an organization seeking to encourage the Ugandan government to resolve the conflict in northern Uganda. The group hosted a conference in London that tried to encourage the LRA to form a political wing in order to articulate its political agenda. Sant'Egidio, a Catholic group, facilitated talks between the government and the LRA, which failed because the LRA still had yet to establish a political wing.
In 1999, Sudan and Uganda signed the Nairobi Agreement, negotiated by the Carter Center, in which Sudan pledged to stop supporting the LRA and Uganda pledged to stop supporting the SPLA. In 2000, the Ugandan parliament passed the Amnesty Act, which grants amnesty to LRA rebels who surrender and denounce the rebellion. In 2001, some of the hundreds of thousands of civilians displaced by the conflict began to return to their homes.
In 2002, Uganda and Sudan reestablished diplomatic ties and signed a protocol allowing the Ugandan military to enter Sudanese territory in order to attack LRA sanctuaries. That same year, the Ugandan military launched Operation Iron Fist against the LRA bases in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. In response, the LRA launched a series of attacks against civilians inside Uganda with a severity not seen since the mid-1990s. Throughout 2003, the Ugandan military continued its offensive.
After many of its bases in southern Sudan were destroyed, the LRA declared a ceasefire and stated it wanted to hold talks with the Uganda government. However, at same time, Kony ordered the LRA to attack Catholic missionaries and other aid organizations. As it became clear that the Sudanese government was decreasing its support for the LRA, Kony sought to acquire more arms. The LRA also extended the geographic scope of its attacks beyond Acholi areas for the first time.
During a visit to Uganda in 2003, Jan Egeland, the United Nations (U.N.) Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, said he could not “find any other part of the world that is having an emergency on the scale of Uganda, that is getting such little international attention. “Egeland also expressed concern about the plight of Ugandan children, stating that they had “been terrorized into becoming killing machines, terrorized into attacking their own villages, killing their own relatives.” In April 2004, the U.N. Security Council made its first statement on the conflict and condemned the LRA for committing “appalling atrocities” and expressed concerned about the widespread displacement of civilians and the abduction of children to be used as soldiers and sex slaves.
LRA activity significantly decreased from 2003 to 2004 as rebels sought to take advantage of the Amnesty Act. LRA commanders contacted bishops involved with Sant'Egidio and said that they wanted to negotiate a peace agreement to end the conflict. In November 2004, the Ugandan government declared a unilateral seven-day ceasefire to allow LRA leadership to meet and discuss possible avenues for diplomacy. The ceasefire, which was had been extended 47 days, ended on December 31 when the LRA declared that it was not yet ready to sign an agreement.
Immediately after the collapse of the ceasefire, Betty Bigombe resumed her contacts with LRA commanders, including Joseph Kony. In January 2005, the Sudanese government in Khartoum signed a peace agreement with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which Uganda has supported. SPLA leader John Garang pledged that he would not allow the LRA to remain in southern Sudan. In February 2005, the Ugandan government declared an 18-day ceasefire. However, Sam Kolo, the LRA’s chief negotiators, surrendered to the Ugandan government, thus removing a channel of communication between the government and the LRA.
In September 2005, LRA deputy commander Vincent Otti and 300 LRA rebels fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which created tense relations between the DRC and Uganda.
In October 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, Netherlands issued arrest warrants for five LRA commanders, including Joseph Kony, for crimes against humanity. President Museveni had referred the matter to the court in 2003. Despite the indictments, the ICC has a limited ability to enforce the warrants. Following the indictments, LRA fighters targeted vehicle belonging to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. Following the attacks, the UN Security management team in northern Uganda suspended all non-essential UN operations. A number of international relief organizations also suspended their activities outside of main towns.
In September 2005, Bigombe had prepared an extensive draft peace plan that President Museveni accepted. However, she was unable to present the plan to Kony before he wanted indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity. In December 2005, Bigombe focused on two goals in negotiations with the LRA. First, she encouraged indicted LRA officials to surrender. Second, she sought to develop incentives for the return of non-indicted LRA members. The LRA discussed the possibility of a unilateral ceasefire, though Joseph Kony reportedly believes that talks are merely a ploy to arrest him.
Current Initiative
In May 2006, Joseph Kony released a video in which he denied any involvement in war crimes and said that he wanted to work to end the conflict. On June 8, 2006, LRA and Ugandan representatives met in Juba, Sudan for talks facilitated by the southern Sudan’s regional government. Talks continued in July 2006. President Museveni offered to grant amnesty to Joseph Kony and other indicted LRA commanders if they surrendered by the end of July. An LRA spokesman rejected the offer of amnesty, stating, “amnesty presupposes surrender…it would mean you are no longer open for discussion.” The International Criminal Court has indicated that, no matter what the outcome of peace negotiations, Kony’s indictment would not be rescinded. President Museveni insisted that an agreement must be reached by September 12. The LRA announced an immediate ceasefire, though the Ugandan government has rejected this because it claims that the LRA has used past ceasefires to rearm and that it will not agree to a new one until a comprehensive agreement is signed. In August 2006, however, Uganda signed a truce with the LRA in hopes of using the agreement as a springboard for further negotiations. Under the terms of the cease fire, the LRA pledged to move its forces out of Uganda to two sanctuaries in southern Sudan. Uganda promised that it would not attack LRA forces in these areas. Despite offers of amnesty, senior LRA commanders remain hesitant to sign a comprehensive agreement without a guarantee that they will not be extradited to International Criminal Court after they have been disarmed. The LRA has also accused the Ugandan government of violating the terms of the truce. See "Update" below for latest developments.
Foreign Policy Positions of Key Players
Uganda
According to the International Crisis Group, the ability of the Uganda army is defeat the insurgency, despite having more than twenty times the LRA’s manpower, is hindered by corruption, abusive behavior, poor organization, and a lack of equipment. Some accuse Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni of exploiting the situation with the IRA to justify high defense spending and restrictions on his political opposition. President Museveni has accused the international donor community of undermining his counterinsurgency campaign by forcing him to limit his defense spending. The situation with the LRA has undermined Uganda’s positive image in the international community, cultivated in part by its successful programs combating HIV/AIDs. Because half of the Ugandan government’s budget comes from international donors, the international community has considerable influence over Museveni’s policies toward the conflict, though he has resisted pressure to lower his defense spending. Uganda claims that the ICC indictment of senior LRA commanders has complicated the current negotiations with the LRA.
Lord’s Resistance Army
The LRA lacks any clear political objective or agenda, aside from desiring to rule Uganda according to the Ten Commandments, though it claims to represent the grievances of the Acholi people. Despite evoking Acholi nationalism, the LRA employs brutal tactics against the Acholi people and subsequently has failed to establish a popular mandate of support, even though few Acholi support the government. The LRA has abducted over 30,000 children to serve as guerillas and sex slaves. According to Amnesty International, the LRA would have few combatants without abducted children. Attacks against the Acholi people serve two functions. First, they aim to discredit the Uganda government for failing to provide the necessary security to prevent the attacks. Second, they “punish” the Acholi people for not openly supporting the rebellion. Kony, who is believed to be the Congo, denies the accusations of crimes against humanity lodged against him by the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands.
Ethnic Acholi in Northern Uganda
The Acholi people, despite their many grievances with the Ugandan government, generally oppose the LRA because it has waged such a brutal campaign against them, despite claiming to represent Acholi interests. Many Acholi see the risks of supporting or not supporting the LRA as essentially equal. That the Acholi people support neither the Uganda government nor the LRA is an ambiguity that makes it difficult to dislodge the LRA because there is little basis for cooperation between the Acholi people and the government. The majority of civilians in northern Uganda live in internally displaced persons camps and many are subject to abuse by the Ugandan military. Furthermore, many Acholi believe that the Ugandan government has explicitly chosen not to protect them from the LRA as punishment for their refusal to support President Museveni.
Sudan
In the past, the Sudanese government provided sanctuary and logistical support to the LRA in response to Uganda’s support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), a rebel movement fighting against the Sudanese government. In 2002, Sudan reversed its policy of supporting the LRA after the U.S. designated it a terrorist organization in December 2001. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Sudan was
eager to distance itself from that perception that it supported terrorism, especially as it had harbored al-Qaeda terrorist Osama bin Laden. Sudan ha seen cooperated with Uganda in efforts to undermine the LRA. Despite the creation of a national unity government in Khartoum, the LRA continues to operate in southern Sudan. Some allege that elements in the Sudanese military that oppose the national unity government continue to support the LRA. However, Sudanese and Ugandan military ties have strengthened. Sudan has granted Uganda permission to conduct joint military operations with the Sudanese Armed Forces inside Sudanese territory.
Congo
A significant number of LRA soldiers now operate from Congolese territory. As a tactical ploy, moving the LRA to the Congo created an alternative safe haven for rebels, and stretched the resources of the Ugandan military, which was already conducting operations against the LRA in southern Sudan and northern Uganda. Uganda military officials also think that the LRA hopes to make contacts with other Rwandan and Ugandan rebel groups in eastern Congo with the goal of destabilizing the Ugandan government. Although at times the Congolese military has been willing to cooperate with Uganda in providing intelligence about the whereabouts and activities of the LRA, in September 2005, Uganda threatened to invade the Congo if it did not expel the LRA from its territory. The Congo subsequently took steps against the LRA incursion. The situation has been addressed in the context of the United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC) and Tripartite Plus Joint Commission. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has urged Uganda, Sudan, and the Congo to coordinate the activities of their security forces to deal with the LRA.
United States
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. has increased its military aid to Uganda and has labeled the LRA a terrorist organization. President Museveni has been one of Africa’s staunchest supporters of the U.S.-led global war against terrorism and the 2003 war in Iraq, even going so far as to allege questionable links between Joseph Kony and al-Qaeda.
The U.S. has expressed concerns about Uganda’s offer of amnesty to the LRA, stating that it believes that those who have committed atrocities should be brought to justice.
International Criminal Court
The ICC has indicted Joseph Kony and four other LRA commanders for crimes against humanity. The ICC has stated that Joseph Kony’s arrest warrant will remain in place regardless of Uganda’s amnesty offers. Although the ICC remains skeptical of any notion of Joseph Kony accepting a peace plan, the court has been largely supportive of Betty Bigombe’s efforts to engage the LRA in talks. To encourage members of the LRA to defect, the ICC has indicated that it has no plans to indict any member of the LRA beyond the five originally indicted. Uganda and the Congo are parties to the Rome Statute and are thus required to cooperate with the ICC. Some, especially in Uganda, have criticized the court for unsealing indictments before a broader, more comprehensive peace arrangement was reached.
Update
In May 2006, the International Criminal Court warned that Uganda had to fulfill its obligations to arrest the five individuals from the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) who had been indicted in 2005 on war crimes charges including rape and murder. Included in the list of those indicted was LRA leader, Joseph Kony (as noted above). For his part, President Museveni responded to the reminder by offering Kony a peace deal. He said that Kony and the LRA had until the end of July to end and war and, in so doing, his safety would be guaranteed. The ICC noted that because it was the Ugandan government which referred the case to the court in the first place, it was incumbent upon Uganda to honor its commitment to apprehend all five individual indicted on war crimes charges.
In early June 2006, the international police agency, INTERPOL, issued wanted notices for the five indicted individuals (including Kony) on behalf of the ICC. It was the first such set of notices issued by INTERPOL ever.
Later in June 2006, Kony was reported to have said that he and the LRA were not involved in any of the atrocities he and his group is alleged to have carried out, and indeed, have been charged with in the world's international court on criminality. The human rights advocacy group, Human Rights Watch, responded by expressing disbelief at Kony's claim but reiterating the fact that he was obligated to face trial at the ICC. Meanwhile, the Ugandan government dismissed Kony's claim as "rediculous." Ugandan government spokesman Robert Kabushenga said, "A lot of information, a lot of evidence has been given by people abducted into the LRA. Young children, people who were their commanders have all admitted publicly [to atrocities], and of course there are reports by journalists who have gone to areas where the LRA has been in and massacred."
In early July 2006, peace talks were scheduled to commence in Sudan between the Ugandan government and the Ugandan rebel movement, the Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan. Before the start of the talks in Sudan, however, President Museveni promised that LRA leader, Joseph Kony, might be granted amnesty. Museveni's office noted in a statement that Kony would be granted amnesty if he responded positively at the peace talks and renounced terrorism.
The promise of amnesty by the Ugandan leader came (1) in the face of the aforementioned indictments of war crimes; and (2) despite a warning by the ICC that Uganda had to fulfill its obligations to arrest the five indicted individuals from the LRA. The move was expected to draw the ire of human rights groups as well as victims' rights enclaves.
Overall, the situation laid bare the uncomfortable tension between the quest for peace and the quest for justice following two decades of brutality.
On July 12, 2006, as the aforementioned talks were scheduled to commence in Sudan between the government and rebels, it was revealed that the top leadership of the LRA would not be in attendance. The Ugandan government wanted to negotiate peace directly with a senior delegation, and as noted above, it even promised amnesty as a possibility for leaders wanted under international law. However, had any of the individuals who were accused of crimes appeared at the talks, they would have been subject to arrest. It was not known whether or not their absence at the peace talks in Sudan was driven by the threat of arrest, or if it would affect the prospects for peace. That said, there was some speculation about the government's attendance at the talks as a result. Nevertheless, peace talks ensued in Sudan, albeit without the presence of high ranking officials from the LRA.
With the peace talks underway, LRA rebel leader Joseph Kony held a formal meeting with Southern Sudanese vice-president and head peace mediator, Riek Machar, as well as a Ugandan official. The talks on August 1, 2006 were held in a clearing of a forest on the border between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, rather than at the official talks within Sudan since the rebels did not want to risk detainment. At that meeting, Kony called for a ceasefire with the government. Kony said, "We wish to categorically state that no meaningful negotiations can take place without a cessation of hostilities." Also, during interviews with journalists, he was asked if he thought he would ever stand trial in The Hague for charges of war crimes. He reiterated his earlier denial of carrying out war crimes saying, "No, no, no... because I did not do anything."
On August 4, 2006, the LRA announced an immediate unilateral ceasefire. LRA Deputy Chief Vincent Otti said in a telephone interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation that all field commanders had been instructed to cease attacks against the Ugandan army. In response, Ugandan Interior Minister Ruhakana Rugunda said that his government wanted to see if the ceasefire announcement would actually go into effect on the ground.
Meanwhile, the peace talks which had taken a short hiatus were scheduled to resume in the Sudanese town of Juba in the second week of August 2006.
But a week after the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) declared a unilateral ceasefire, the Ugandan army announced on August 13, 2006 that it had killed a senior member of that rebel enclave. A military spokesman said that Raska Lukwiya, who was wanted for war crimes, was shot dead in Kitgum after his group launched an ambush. A soldier and a civilian were also killed in the altercation. Lukwiya was described as the LRA's third highest ranking leader. It was not known how his death would affect peace talks, which ended without agreement and resulted in the absence of LRA representatives at talks following their truce announcement.
With questions abounding a regarding the prospects for a solution, President Yoweri Museveni set a deadline of September 12, 2006 by which a final peace deal had to be forged. A day before that deadline, LRA rebels converged on Juba in Sudan to reconvene for peace talks.
A month later, the truce between the Ugandan army and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was underway, although it was quickly compromised. In mid-October 2006, both sides violated the terms of their ceasefire, which was aimed at ending two decades of conflict. LRA rebels violated the agreement by failing to assemble at both of the two points specified in southern Sudan -- a requisite element for amnesty. On the other side of the equation, Ugandan forces approached a rebel stronghold in violation of the ceasefire deal. LRA rebels said that fear of attack prevented them from assembling at the two sites, while the government said that the army had approached the rebel safe haven to check on the status of the LRA. Both sides accepted responsibility for their respective violations, which highlighted the climate of mistrust between them.
In mid-2007, the LRA said that it did not have the funding to pay for foreign travel. As such, its ability to contact commanders located in remote areas would be difficult, and thusly, delay the peace negotiations. Nevertheless, by August 2007, in Juba in the Sudan, the LRA and the government were on track to forge a permanent ceasefire.
For its part, the LRA has operated across borders in an area that traverses at least four countries. In 2008, LRA leader, Joseph Kony, refused to sign a peace deal until the International Criminal Court (ICC) withdrew its arrest warrants. This action was followed by a joint-offensive by the governments of Uganda, DRC and Sudan in an effort to stamp out the rebels. While the peace deal was eventually signed, since late 2008, LRA rebels have nonetheless continued to attack villages.
By the start of 2009, the wide expanse of area from Central African Republic, through Sudan and into the DRC, has been part of the LRA terrain, although it is primarily based in DRC. In an effort to repel the LRA, the government of the Central African Republic said that it would deploy its own troops to the border with the DRC.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said at the start of 2009 that Ugandan rebels, known as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), were carrying out vicious attacks on civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and southern Sudan.
According to local accounts to the UNHRC, rebel attacks on villages in Duru in the DRC resulted in the killing of a four-year old girl, the abduction of a nine-year old boy, and the mauling of two men. As well, the LRA rebels looted homes before burning them to the ground. Survivors were forced to flee to the forested areas around the village. In the forest, people were being forced to live without food, water, medicine or sanitation since movement could lead to further attacks by the LRA.
According to an Anglican bishop in the southern Sudanese town of Mundri, an attack by LRA rebels resulted in the abduction of two boys. When two of his parishioners attempted to rescue them, they were caught and faced brutal retribution by the rebels. Indeed, the two boys who were subsequently rescued reported that while they were still alive, the hands and legs of the two parishioners were hacked off; they were then beaten to death.
Editor's Note:
During the 20-year long conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government, tens of thousands of people have died and two million have been displaced. The LRA gained notoriety during this period for its gross violations of human rights, such as rape, torture, mutilation, murder and abduction of children for the purpose of making them either child soldiers or sex slaves. United Nations Humanitarian Affairs head, Jan Egeland, has described the LRA's activities as being akin to the worst form of terrorism in the world. He has also characterized the situation in Central Africa as a horrific humanitarian crisis.
Written by Ryan Holliway, Researcher and Writer, CountryWatch Inc. and Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc.
Sources: International Crisis Group, BBC, Uganda Conflict Action Network, U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Associated Press, Reuters, Africa News, The Economist